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STATEMENT REGARDING FACTS1 
Space constraints preclude the Jensens from pointing out the many areas of dispute 
in the appellees' fact statements. Ironically, at the same time that the appellees are 
arguing that the federal court's ruling resolved all facts necessary for the lower court to 
rule on the Jensens' state law claims, they simultaneously ask this Court to consider 
portions of the record not cited in the federal court's ruling. See, e.g., Wagner/Albritton 
Brief, p. 7 n.2 (citations in defendants' fact statement designated as other than to FC-R 
are "added" facts from the record). That is what the Jensens asked the trial court to do -
review the record, and apply it to the Jensens' state law claims. 
Nonetheless, a few examples illustrate the existence of fact disputes even under 
the appellees' own record citations: 
A critical issue in this case is whether the Jensens were trying to get confirmation 
of the diagnosis (as they say), or insisting on experimental treatment (as the appellees 
say). This is crucial because even the appellees do not argue that, under the state 
constitution, a child can be taken removed from parents who are following the 
recommendations of a licensed physician to seek reasonable confirmatory testing. 
Accordingly, the only way appellees can argue that their actions were narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling state interest is by claiming that the Jensens were not questioning 
the diagnosis when Wagner reported them to DCFS. Thus, Wagner/Albritton's brief 
says: 
1
 For brievity, the Jensens refer to appellees Wagner and Albritton as "Wagner/Albritton," 
and Anderson, Cunningham, and Eisenman as "the DCFS Defendants." 
1 
At the [June 9, 2003] meeting, the Jensens never mentioned genetic testing; they 
raised no questions about it. (FC-R. 96-97.) The subject never came up, because the 
Jensens were not questioning the diagnosis - only the treatment - as they were 
opposed to conventional chemotherapy treatment. Id. [Wagner/Albritton Brief at 
19.] 
The only record cite offered for this "undisputed" fact was testimony of appellee 
Wagner's supervisor, Dr. Lemons, that Wagner never told him that the family had requested 
molecular or genetic testing. In other words, Wagner/Albritton's sole citation for the 
proposition that the Jensens were not questioning the diagnosis was Wagner's failure to tell 
others that they were questioning the diagnosis - one of the very omissions upon which the 
Jensens base their claim. 
Not only is this assertion unsupported, but it ignores rather overwhelming evidence 
to the contrary. For example: Wagner does not dispute that the Jensens requested a second 
opinion from Dana-Farber because they wanted to confirm the diagnosis. {See Appellants' 
Brief at 8.) Wagaer/Albritton acknowledged below that, on June 9, the Jensens asked about 
the language of the pathology test, and "[t]he Jensens suggested that because the tumor did 
not appear in the bone, as Ewing's sarcoma usually does, then it may not be Ewing's 
sarcoma." (R. 404,2365.) The Jensens asked at this meeting for another sample of Parker's 
tissue to be tested, and were refused. Barbara Jensen stated that "PCMC keeps jumping to 
treatment," and Daren Jensen said, "We are doing A, B, C, and he was doing A and then Z." 
(R. 2161,2435; see also 2411-12, 2422-23; Brief of Appellants, pp. 11, 13.) 
Another pivotal event in this case involved DCFS liaison David Corwin's attempt 
to schedule a meeting between him, Wagner, the Jensens, and the Jensens' doctor who 
was questioning the diagnosis. This meeting would have afforded an opportunity for the 
2 
Jensens to explain to a neutral party their request for confirmatory testing, which Wagner 
implied to Corwin had already been done. The Jensens and Corwin agreed to meet, but 
Wagner refused and instead reported the Jensens to DCFS, misrepresenting - repeatedly 
- that it was the Jensens who refused to meet. (See Brief of Appellants, pp. 12-13, 74.) 
This obviously cannot be considered "narrowly tailored" conduct under the state 
constitution; hence, appellees recharacterize it more favorably to themselves: 
Dr. Corwin and Mr. Jensen unsuccessfully attempted to schedule a further meeting to 
discuss the situation. (FC-R. 122.) [R. 515 (Ex. 29, pp. 103-105, 111-112, 119-121; 
Ex. 31; Ex. 4, pp. 231-232).] At that point, the decision was made to refer PJ's case 
to DCFS to medical neglect in refusing what the doctors believed was medically 
necessary treatment. (FC-R. 122-123.) Id. [Wagner/AlbrittonBriefat2L] 
Appellees assert numerous other examples of "undisputed" facts that are quite 
obviously disputed. For example: They move up the date when the lump was first 
noticed (because the much earlier date is inconsistent with a fast-growing cancer) (R. 
1132, 3283, 2332-34); claim that it had grown and changed color (not true, see R. 2333-
34); state that Ewing's "may" be diagnosed through cytogenetic / molecular testing that 
"often" reveals an 11 ;22 translocation, when all witnesses agreed that such testing is the 
gold standard for diagnosing Ewing's, and an 11;22 is found in 95 percent of Ewing's 
patients (see Appellants' Brief, pp. 5, 15; R. 392, 515 (Ex. 62, p.2), 1271 (p. 17), 2668, 
3205, 3360; Wagner/Albritton Brief, p. 10); state that the Burzynski Clinic had no 
experience with pediatric Ewing's Sarcoma, when it is undisputed that it did treat the 
synonymous "PNET outside the central nervous system" and "soft tissue sarcoma" (R. 
3134-35); state that the clinic only did FDA clinical trials, when that was only one 
department within the clinic (R. 3125, 3631-38); claim that the AEWS0031 Clinical Trial 
3 
did not influence Wagner's actions when Wagner himself testified that he refused genetic 
testing because it was not required by the Clinical Trial (R. 3180; see also 3164-65, 3196; 
Appellants' Brief, pp. 5, 15); state that Wagner had no motivation to make 
misrepresentations after the Clinical Trial enrollment deadline passed, when there was 
evidence that the deadline he was using did not pass until June 20, and Wagner had already 
gone public with his allegations by that point and could not simply say, "Nevermind." (R. 
3378, 3386; see Appellants' Brief, p. 6.) 
Wagner/Albritton further state: 
Dr. Coffin's diagnostic method and analysis met the standard of care, according to 
Dr. Christopher D. M. Fletcher, a world expert in diagnosing soft tissue sarcomas. 
[R. 515 (Ex. 21; Ex. 22, pp. 19,95, 127).] [Wagner/Albritton Brief at 12.] 
This testimony is, again, characterized in the manner most favorable to Wagner and 
Albritton. Dr. Fletcher (their expert witness) actually admitted that what the pathologists 
did was the least that could be done and still meet the minimum standard of care. (R. 2073-
74). More fundamentally, this statement disregards the testimony of every medical witness 
below (except Wagner) that, regardless of whether Wagner personally felt that genetic 
testing was necessary, it was appropriate and reasonable for the Jensens to seek such testing 
for their child. (E.g., R. 1500-02, 1759-60, 3360.) 
Another important factor in the Jensens' state constitutional claims is that Wagner 
reported the Jensens after being informed that they were going to seek out another hospital 
to obtain the requested diagnostic testing. Because that would be inconsistent with 
appellees' claim that the Jensens were simply refusing treatment, their brief states: "The 
Jensens left the meeting, telling the PCMC representatives, "You're fired." (FC-R. 122) [R. 
4 
515 (Ex. 1, p. 181).] and leaves out the immediately preceding key words. Quoted in full, 
the Jensens said, "We're going to go find another hospital that will work with us. You're 
fired." (R. 2412 (emphasis added).) 
Another key aspect of the Jensens' state constitutional claims is that appellees 
Eisenman and Cunningham did not tell the juvenile court that L. A. Children's genetic test 
results were not yet back when they obtained custody of Parker. This is important because, 
as the juvenile court had stated, those results were to be controlling of Parker's care. To 
avoid the consequence of this fact, appellees state: 
On July 18, 2003, Dr. Tishler was told by CHLA pathologist, Dr. Gonzales, that he 
had diagnosed PJ's tissue as Ewing's sarcoma, and that the final results of his 
analysis would follow in a few days. [R. 515 (Ex. 41, pp. 43-44; Ex. 44, p. 2).].... 
Per the [July 10, 2003] stipulation, the Jensens traveled to Los Angeles, where PJ 
met with Dr. Tishler on July 21,2003. (FC-R. 125) [R. 515 (Ex. 41, p. 25).] Dr. 
Tishler told the Jensens that based on the pathology tests done at LabCorp, PCMC 
and University of Washington and from what he was told by Dr. Gonzales, that: 
"The results are likely nonequivocal and indicate the presence of a high grade 
malignant lesion." [R. 515 (Ex. 43, p. 10).] [Wagner/Albritton Brief, pp. 25-26J 
Tishler actually testified that, while the date on the (immunohistochemical) 
pathology report pre-dated the Jensen meeting, he had not seen the report when he met with 
the Jensens, and everything he said to the Jensens on May 21 was based on the outside 
facility's information. He further said that, even if he had received preliminary information 
about PJ's tissue, he would never have mentioned incomplete or unfinished testing to the 
Jensens. Tishler reiterated in court on July 28, 2003, that genetic testing was not complete, 
2
 This was factual knowledge by Eisenman, because she was the last to have 
communication with Tishler, and knew that he had not reported any test results. 
5 
and stated in his deposition that he might never have seen the pathology report. (R. 3088-
89,3165-67.) 
Wagner/Albritton further state: 
[B]ased on Dr. Tishler's testimony, the juvenile court ordered that PJ commence 
chemotherapy before August 8, 2003, without regard to the CHLA test results. (FC-
R. 126.) [R. 515 (Ex. 10, pp. 237-240).] [Wagner/Albritton Brief at 27J 
To the contrary, Dr. Tishler stated repeatedly that he would not be making any final 
recommendations until after his test results were in, and the juvenile court scheduled the 
anticipated start date for chemotherapy only after receiving an estimate of when those 
results would be back. (R. 515 (Ex. 33c, pp. 23-24, 60, 62, 63-66), 3562, 3703.) The 
juvenile court also ruled that the Jensens would be given an evidentiary hearing on August 
20 "in the event PJ.'s situation was not yet resolved." (Wagner/Albritton Brief at 29, 
citing (FC-R. 127) [R. 515 (Ex. 10, pp. 238-239)].)3 
Perhaps most typical of the appellees' approach to the facts is Wagner/Albritton5 s 
attempt to explain the inconvenient fact that Parker Jensen is alive and well seven years 
after he was supposed to be dead within "two weeks." Parker has a "90% chance or greater 
of eventually developing metastatic disease," they say, and "will more than likely eventually 
die from Ewing's sarcoma." (Wagner/Albritton Brief, p. 40) But the only record citation is 
to their expert's testimony regarding general statistics; he expressly testified that he could 
not render any opinion as to Parker's prognosis because he lacked sufficient information. 
The Guardian ad Litem's notes were that the juvenile court ruled that LACH's test 
results were to be "determinative." (R. 3481-83, 3620.) Presumably, considering that no 
minutes or order were available until after the Jensens had been accused of violating the 
order, it was reasonable for the Jensens to interpret the judge's oral ruling the same way 
as the GAL. 
6 
(R. 515 (Ex. 19, pp. 112-117).) Appellees also ignore the October 8, 2003, testimony of Dr. 
Johnston in Boise, who was personally involved in PJ's case, that "if [Parker] could get to 
the point where he was about three years out from the beginning of treatment.. .at that point, 
if the tumor has not come back, it almost certainly will not come back." (R. 3575.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLEES HAVE NOT MET THEIR BURDEN OF 
ESTABLISHING THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF RES 
JUDICATA. 
Appellees' briefs have not rectified any of the fatal flaws in the trial court's ruling. 
First, although the DCFS Defendants cite a few cases in which intermediate state courts 
appear to use res judicata language regarding issues in a single case (and some that do 
not)4, application of the doctrine in this case is governed by Tenth Circuit law, under 
which res judicata is inapplicable to claims or issues in a single case. Mcllravy v. Kerr-
McGee Coal Corp., 204 F.3d 1031, 1034 n.l (10th Cir. 2000) ("Res judicata does not 
speak to direct attacks in the same case, but rather has application in subsequent 
actions.") Appellees do not challenge that law. Indeed, Wagner/Albritton conceded as 
much at the hearing below. See R. 4220 (Transcript) at 6, Reply Add.Exh. 2 ("The 
plaintiffs have pointed out, and I think technically correctly, that res judicata, technically, 
may not apply within the same case.")5 
4
 See, e.g., Vines v. Univ. of Louisiana at Monroe, 398 F.3d 700 (5th Cir. 2005) (multiple 
actions). 
5
 Wagner/Albritton argue that one vs. two cases is a "distinction without a difference." 
The Tenth Circuit apparently feels otherwise. Moreover, the only case cited by 
7 
On appeal, both sets of appellees urge that the federal court's ruling imposed a 
"mandate" that the state court must follow as "law of the case." (Wagner/Albritton brief 
at 56-57; DCFS Defendants' brief at 31.) Although this argument would not affect the 
outcome, see infra, the Jensens note that it was not preserved below. None of the 
defendants mentioned law of the case in their summary judgment motions or supporting 
memoranda. (R. 281, 947, 1012, 1076, 1030, 1083, 1086, 1089.) 
When Wagner/Albritton belatedly attempted to raise law of the case for the first 
time in their reply memorandum (R. 4190), the Jensens objected. The Jensens' counsel 
noted that, had law of the case been raised, they would have briefed the matter 
differently. {See R. 4220 (Transcript) at 42, Reply Add.Exh. 2.) For example, counsel 
stated, the Jensens would have argued that law of the case would be discretionary as to 
the state claims, see, e.g., Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 216 P.3d 352, 
2009 UT 43, K 12 ("While a case remains pending before the district court prior to any 
appeal, the parties are bound by the court's prior decision, but the court remains free to 
reconsider that decision. It may do so sua sponte or at the suggestion of one of the 
parties"); Farr v. Hughes, 2009 UT App 161 (mem. dec.)("It is true that 'under the law of 
the case doctrine, a decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in 
successive stages of the same litigation.' However, even after granting summary 
judgment, 'the [trial] court remains free to reconsider that decision.'") (citations omitted). 
Wagner/Albritton, Oman v. Davis SchoolDist., 2008 UT 70, 194 P.3d 956, involved a 
plaintiff who brought a state action after losing in federal court - i.e., two cases. 
8 
Additionally, the Jensens' counsel noted that, if law of the case were at issue, they 
would have argued that the defendants were precluded from rearguing adverse legal 
rulings issued by the federal court, such as Judge Cassell's legal determination that the 
Spackman elements are satisfied in this case {see Reply Add.Exh. 1 at 28-31), and that 
the Jensens' three remaining state constitutional claims are cognizable independent of the 
Jensens' federal claims. See R. 4220 (Transcript) at 43, Reply Add.Exh. 2; id. ("had they 
argued law of the case, we would have said great, that just saved us 20 pages of arguing 
the history of the State Constitution"). The trial court confined its ruling to the 
defendants' arguments on res judicata. (R. 4206.) 
Frankly, reframing their argument does not help appellees in any event, because 
the only "mandate" offered by the federal court regarding the state constitutional claims 
is that they "present important questions of state law" that should be decided by the state 
court - hardly an indicator that the state court should consider its hands tied. 
More important, the appellees continue to go about this whole process backwards. 
Although the Jensens have extensively explained why state constitutional protections are 
broader than the federal, that is not actually their obligation. Federal law (which governs 
application ofres judicata to federal rulings) is quite clear: Whether they are arguing 
claim or issue preclusion, it is the defendants' burden to prove that the issues or claims 
are identical, not the plaintiffs burden to prove that they are not. See Brief of 
Appellants, pp. 63, 66; Valley View Angus Ranch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Field Services, 
Inc., 497 F.3d 1096, 1107 (10th Cir. 2007)(reversing grant of summary judgment where 
the "(defendant] has failed to bear its burden to affirmatively prove the defense of issue 
9 
preclusion"); Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1093 (10th Cir. 
2003)(defendants have the burden of establishing issue preclusion, including identity of 
issues). 
In the trial court and on appeal, the Jensens explained at length how the evidence 
would support a violation of specific state constitutional provisions. Appellees have not 
done the converse, analyzing what issues would be pertinent to (let alone dispositive of) 
these same provisions.6 
Thus, for example, appellee Anderson suggests that the federal court's finding that 
he did not act with "deliberate indifference" precludes one or more of the Jensens' state 
claims. How? Is deliberate indifference a threshold requirement on any of the Jensens' 
state constitutional claims? Anderson makes no attempt to show that it is. 
Regarding his alleged material omissions, Anderson cites a statement by the 
federal court that "Plaintiffs did 'not direct[] the Court to evidence that Mr. Anderson 
knew the Juvenile Court was unaware of the possibility of genetic testing or that genetic 
tests were 'definitive,'" and "Plaintiffs had adduced no evidence that Anderson 
understood" that a stipulation had been violated," etc. Again, this misapprehends the 
parties' burdens. In state court, Anderson is required to affirmatively demonstrate the 
absence of a fact issue. "[U]nless the moving party meets its initial burden to present 
evidence establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, 'the party opposing the 
motion is under no obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" 
6
 Similarly, the appellees did not provide to the lower court any analysis of the elements 
of the Jensens' common law claims, and whether or how issues decided by the federal 
court would have any bearing on them. 
10 
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P.3d 600 (unlike federal law, Utah law does not allow 
a summary judgment movant to merely allege a lack of evidence in the nonmoving 
party's case, but instead requires a movant to affirmatively provide factual evidence 
establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact) (citations omitted)). 
Appellee Cunningham's argument is equally noncompliant with applicable 
standards when seeking summary judgment based upon res judicata. For example, 
Cunningham cites a factfinding by the federal court that any misrepresentations she made 
were not "deliberate" - an assessment of a party's mental state that would be improper 
under state law - but would that dispose of the Jensens' claims against her? The Jensens 
have argued that recklessness is sufficient for a state constitutional claim - reckless 
actions are by definition not "narrowly tailored" - and the federal court made no findings 
regarding recklessness. Cunningham does not address any of these issues. 
Like all of the other defendants (and the trial court), Cunningham simply assumes 
that whatever barred the Jensens' federal constitutional claims against her automatically 
bars their state constitutional claims, even though this Court has stated that the federal 
constitution sets the floor, not the ceiling, of constitutional protections for Utahns. See, 
e.g., Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, % 17, 108 P.3d 701. Assumptions do not 
even come close to meeting a defendant's burden of proving that issues or claims are 
identical, as required to prevail on an affirmative defense of res judicata. 
Appellee Eisenman similarly fails to make any attempt to show that the scope and 
effect of the issues are identical in the Jensens' federal and state claims. (She does make 
an alternative de novo argument for immunity under state law, which is addressed infra?) 
11 
Instead, Eisenman recites certain rulings by the federal court and then simply says, in 
effect, "These rulings must dispose of the state claims, too," with no further analysis. 
Wagner and Albritton's positions are even less clear. What issues are dispositive 
of the state constitutional claims against them, and why? They do not say. Can judgment 
on the state constitutional claims be sustained solely on the federal court's ruling, or must 
the trial court also review Wagner/Albritton's additional record citations? They do not 
say. (If it is the latter, then the ruling was erroneous on its face, as the trial court 
admittedly conducted no review of the record at all, let alone of the Jensens' competing 
citations.) 
In short, the appellees' arguments do not address, let alone satisfy as a matter of 
law, any of the applicable standards - (1) the federal res judicata requirement of 
affirmatively proving that the issues/claims are identical; (2) this Court's requirement that 
a defendant affirmatively demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment, rather than 
baldly stating that the plaintiff cannot prove their case, Orvis, supra; or (3) the primacy 
approach to state constitutional analysis, in which the state constitution is reviewed 
independently, and federal law is no more controlling than law from sister states. See 
Brief of Appellants, pp. 37-39, 42-43.7 
7
 To illustrate the error in the appellees (and the trial court's approach), assume that a 
plaintiff has a federal statutory claim, and state breach of contract, negligence, and 
negligent misrepresentation claims. The federal court issues certain factual rulings 
dispositive of the federal statutory claim, and then remands the state claims. No 
defendant would argue that it satisfies his burden of proof on res judicata to file a motion 
that said, "The trial court issued this ruling. It disposes of the plaintiffs' breach of 
contract, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation claims," without analyzing the 
12 
In the absence of any effort by the defendants to prove which issues would be 
dispositive of which state constitutional claim(s), or why, the trial court was left with a 
generic contention that all of the Jensens' state constitutional claims are identical to all of 
their federal claims, and therefore all of the issues must automatically be the same. And 
that is essentially what the trial court ruled: 
[T]he issues in this case arise from a single, distinct set of events and as 
demonstrated by the Memorandum Decision of Judge Stewart, the factual 
contentions that underlie the Plaintiffs' state law claims against the Defendants 
have been conclusively decided. This said, Judge Stewart's legal conclusions bar 
Plaintiffs' claims under the Utah Constitution because there is no historical or 
textual basis for interpreting Utah's Constitutional provisions in this case 
differently from the Federal Constitution. Moreover, no Utah appellate decision 
supports interpreting the Utah Constitution to provide broader or different rights in 
this case. 
* * * 
In sum, the facts, the alleged harm, and the analysis of plaintiffs' state law claims 
are the same as those already considered and dismissed by Judge Stewart and, 
there being no additional or different rights provided by the Utah Constitution, 
dismissal is appropriate in this forum as well. 
R. 4203 (emphases added). 
On appeal, Wagner/Albritton urge this Court to adopt a similar blanket approach, 
stating: 
As established below, there is no material difference between these rights under 
the U. S. Constitution and the Utah Constitution. Since the rights and claims are 
identical so are the underlying factual and legal issues. 
elements of each claim and why the federal court's ruling disposed of them as well. Yet 
that is what appellees have done with respect to the Jensens' state constitutional claims. 
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(Wagner/Albritton Brief at 45 (emphasis added).) But that improperly shifts the burden 
on Wagner/Albritton's affirmative defense to the Jensens. 
The appellees do state in passing that the Jensens' state and federal claims are 
identical. However, their principal support for this assertion is not affirmative analysis, 
but merely a complaint that the Jensens have not cited Utah cases involving similar facts 
(as if these facts could ever be duplicated). It is a reality that many litigants - including 
the appellees - do not independently brief state constitutional claims, and this Court has 
never imposed the Catch-22 requirement of a factually similar Utah case finding greater 
protection before the Court can find greater protection. As in all areas of the law, parties 
and courts extrapolate from existing precedent (including some "antiquated" cases, as the 
DCFS Defendants put it, which reflects how long these principles have been recognized). 
Moreover, other than dismissing it as an "irrelevant discourse of Utah history," the 
appellees do not challenge the Jensens' analysis of the motives, backgrounds, 
experiences, wording choices, and authority influential to the state constitution's 
Framers, nor their case law from other jurisdictions and commentary, all of which 
considerations this Court has endorsed when addressing the scope of state constitutional 
protections (and other legal issues, for that matter). 
Nor do the appellees contest the principles elucidated in the Utah cases that are 
cited by the Jensens, or explain why the broader protections afforded to such activities as 
8
 On appeal, the DCFS Defendants acknowledge that the Jensens' state and federal claims 
are not identical (DCFS Defendants' Brief, p. 31), which in itself demonstrates error in 
the trial court's analysis. 
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board of pardons proceedings or the conducting of a business would be denied to the far 
greater fundamental right of caring for one's child. In short, the Jensens' analysis of the 
breadth of the Utah Constitution's protections is essentially unchallenged. The appellees' 
few arguments regarding specific constitutional provisions are addressed here: 
A. Inherent / inalienable rights, Art. I, § 1. 
Wagner/Albritton argue that claims involving familial association / direction of 
medical care should be limited to Art. I, § 7 (due process), because in an earlier case 
involving a court proceeding, this Court addressed the issue under § 7. Of course, not all 
of the defendants' actions were confined to the juvenile court proceeding itself. In any 
event, the same conduct often creates potential liability under more than one theory (e.g., 
bad faith and fraud). As long as double recovery is avoided, the plaintiff may present 
both causes to the jury. 
B. Due Process, Art. I, § 7. 
Appellees state that Utah and federal due process rights are the same, but offer no 
explanation why, other than mentioning that this Court has sometimes found them to be 
the same, and sometimes found them not to be. (Wagner/Albritton Brief, pp. 61-62.) 
The Jensens' analysis of why they are in fact different in this case is unchallenged. 
Elsewhere in their brief, Wagner/Albritton argue that "[t]he Jensens' core 
contention that the government cannot dictate a child's medical treatment is misguided." 
(Wagner/Albritton Brief at 41.) According to Wagner/Albritton, the sole issue is that 
"[the Jensens] believe that it was their decision alone to either not treat P.J. or treat him 
with Insulin Potentiation Therapy, whose efficacy and safety had not been proven." Id. 
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"[T]he juvenile court has the power and duty to order that a child be treated with standard 
curative therapy to save his life/5 they argue. Id at 42. 
Apart from the fact these contentions are unsupported by analysis or authority, 
they do not aid the appellees because they have nothing to do with the Jensens' actual 
claims: that the Jensens had a state constitutional right to follow the recommendation of 
a licensed physician that they seek readily available, reliable diagnostic testing without 
being reported to DCFS for doing so, and without having appellees force them to choose 
one physician over another or take custody of their child based upon material 
misrepresentations and omissions.9 
C Art I, § 14. 
Wagner/Albritton argue that the Jensens' rights under Art. I, § 14 are the same as 
the Fourth Amendment, because one of the cases cited by the Jensens, State v. Bean, 869 
P.2d 984 (Utah 1994), "is a seizure case, so it does not apply here because the Jensens 
were never physically seized." (Wagner/Albritton Brief at 62.) Apart from the fact that 
this is just another "We disagree" argument rather than affirmative analysis, the Jensens 
were seized (Daren was arrested, and he and Barbara were both booked into jail). 
Moreover, Wagner/Albritton ignore entirely the Jensens' arguments as to why the 
9
 Wagner/Albritton say that their point in this case is "prove[d]" by the asserted fact that 
the child at issue in a 1979 case cited by the Jensens later died from Hodgkin's disease. 
Of course, it is unknown whether the state-requested treatment would have made any 
difference to that outcome. (If the defendants had succeeded in forcing unneeded 
chemotherapy on Parker Jensen, undoubtedly they would now be claiming that they 
"cured" him.) However, if Wagner/Albritton contend that the correctness of the parties' 
position is proved by the outcome, the fact that Parker is in Chile serving a mission seven 
years after he was supposed to be dead would seem to refute their own argument. 
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restraints to which they were subjected would unquestionably be considered a seizure 
under the Utah Constitution. See Brief of Appellants, pp. 60-62. 
The DCFS Defendants argue that there is nothing in Utah's history that would 
support greater rights under § 14 than under the Fourth Amendment. More specifically, 
they argue that the polygamy prosecutions are irrelevant, citing Paul G. Cassell, "Search 
and Seizure and the Utah Constitution, The Irrelevance of the Antipolygamy Raids," 
1995 B.Y.U.L.REV. 1. Ironically, appellees previously cited this same article to its 
author, (then) Judge Cassell, who disagreed with their interpretation, ruling that the 
Jensens' § 14 claim is independently cognizable. See Reply Add.Exh. 1 at 38-41.10 
Apart from the foregoing, the Jensens argued alternatively in their opening brief 
that, even if issue or claim preclusion might otherwise apply, policy considerations would 
not support its application here. That argument is particularly compelling in the unique 
procedural posture of this case: (1) Fully briefed state constitutional claims, (2) involving 
fundamental rights, (3) originally brought in state court and included in the case from its 
inception, (4) have already been ruled by the federal court to be separately cognizable 
from the federal claims, and (5) the federal court went out of its way not simply to 
decline jurisdiction, but to emphasize that it was doing so because the Jensens' "Utah 
constitutional claims present important questions of state law[.]" If ever a case called for 
the non-application of res judicata, this is it. 
10
 The DCFS Defendants do not mention the reasoning behind Prof. Cassell's argument in 
the article, which was that the polygamy prosecutions would not have affected the 
Framers' general attitudes toward crime. Such rationale - that Utah's Framers would not 
have been pro-criminal - obviously would not apply to innocent parents and children. 
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Wagner/Albritton argue that issue preclusion would "prevent[] inconsistent 
outcomes based on the same events/' and the federal court has reviewed the evidence 
"and found nothing to indicate that the doctors violated the Jensens' rights." But that 
argument only has force if the "rights" are identical under the state and federal 
constitutions; otherwise, there is nothing inconsistent about allowing the Jensens to 
recover for violations of one and not the other11. 
n. APPELLEES HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED AN ALTERNATIVE 
BASIS FOR AFFIRMANCE UNDER SPACEMAN. 
Appellees seek affirmance on the alternate ground that plaintiffs have not met the 
requirements for a damages claim under the state constitution outlined in Spackman v. 
Bd. Of Ed Of Box Elder County Sck Dist, 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533. (In federal court, 
Judge Cassell ruled that, for three of the four state constitutional claims, Spackman is 
satisfied (see Reply Add.Exh. 1, pp. 28-31). The defendants did not appeal that ruling, or 
Judge Cassell's ruling that Art. I, §§ 1, 7, and 14 are self-executing.) 
Under Spackman, a plaintiff seeking damages for violation of the state constitution 
must prove that (1) the constitutional violation was "flagrant"; (2) that "existing 
remedies" do not redress his injuries; and 3) that equitable relief is inadequate to protect 
the plaintiffs rights or redress his or her injuries. 
11
 Wagner/Albritton also suggest that the Jensens' claims are barred by the juvenile court 
action. (Wagner/Albritton Brief at 42.) They say that "comparative fitness" was 
"litigated before the juvenile court," but provide no support for, or analysis of, that 
contention. If Wagner/Albritton mean to suggest that the juvenile court proceeding 
somehow has res judicata effect, that legal argument was rejected by Judge Cassell, see 
Reply Add.Exh. 1, pp. 31-33. 
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A. Flagrancy of Constitutional Violations of Article I, §§ 1 & 7. 
In essence, [flagrancy] means that a defendant must have violated "clearly 
established" constitutional rights "of which a reasonable person would 
have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 
L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). To be considered clearly established, "[t]he contours 
of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) 
(citations omitted). 
Spackrnan, supra at f 23. 
Wagner and Albritton imply that Judge Stewart found that the law was not clearly 
established, Wagner/Albritton Brief at 65, but as they acknowledge elsewhere, "the court 
did not reach the qualified immunity question as to whether the violated right was clearly 
established." Id. at 54. In fact, both Judge Stewart and Judge Cassell recognized that the 
alleged constitutional rights are clearly established, under both federal and state law. See, 
e.g., Reply Add.Exh. 1 at 30 ("The alleged violations of these sections appear to be 
"flagrant"); 37 ("There is no compelling state interest in falsifying or misrepresenting 
evidence to a juvenile court."), and 42 ("multiple factual misrepresentations...omission[s] 
or falsehoods would undoubtedly affect the fairness of the proceedings."); see also Brief 
of Appellants Add.Exh. 3 at 32 ("...the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care ...is not 
only fundamental, but is also clearly established"). 
It has long been established that Article I, §§ 1 and 7 of the Utah Constitution 
guarantee both procedural and substantive due process rights, including the fundamental 
rights attendant in the parent-child relationship. Wells v. Children's AidSoc. of Utah, 681 
P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982) (Art. I § 7 recognizes 
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and protect "the inherent and retained right of a parent to maintain parental ties to his or 
her child"); Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22, 24 (1904) (defining right of 
"liberty" encompassed in Art. I § 1 as "a term of comprehensive scope[] ... embracing] 
not only freedom from servitude and from imprisonment and arbitrary restraint of person, 
but also all our religious, civil, political, and personal rights").) 
The requirement that a DCFS caseworker do at least some investigation of neglect 
allegations - statutorily recognized as a component of due process - was likewise clear in 
2003. Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-409(l) & (2) (2003); § 62A-4a-202.3(2)(a)-(g) (2003). 
DCFS' primary purpose is to protect children from abuse and neglect, Utah Code Ann. § 
62A-4a-201(2), but it can only do so by using "the least intrusive means available," § 
62A-4a-201(3), and in undertaking those least intrusive means, it must protect Utah 
parents' "fundamental right and duty to exercise primary control over the care, 
supervision, upbringing, and education of their children." § 62A-4a-201(l)(b) (2003). 
Appellees do not dispute that these rights are fundamental; hence, governmental 
actors have long been on notice that interference with the parent-child relationship is 
presumptively unconstitutional unless they can prove that their actions were "narrowly 
tailored" to serve a "compelling state interest." Wells, 681 P.2d at 206-07. It goes 
12
 While the federal court held that the claimed "emergency" barred a federal 
constitutional claim (even though Cunningham said she never investigated any medical 
neglect reports), this excuse would not bar a state constitutional violation, as evidenced 
by the Framers' unique and intense concerns about forced separation of the family, which 
appellees have not refuted. E.g., Brief of Appellants, pp. 54-55. Moreover, even in an 
emergency, Cunningham was still required to "meet with the parents, attempt to negotiate 
voluntary compliance with medical treatment pending or in lieu of court involvement, 
and assess and document the parents' reasons for refusal to treat." (R. 3431.) 
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without saying that the State has a compelling state interest in protecting the health and 
well-being of children. See In re J.P., supra. However, it also goes without saying that 
there can never be a compelling state interest in falsifying or misrepresenting evidence, of 
which there is evidence that all defendants did, or reporting parents to DCFS for seeking 
reasonable diagnostic testing. See, e.g., Reply Add.Exh.l, p. 37. Nor can such 
misconduct be considered narrowly tailored. 
The Jensens' entitlement to a procedurally sound involvement with DCFS and the 
juvenile court is also clearly established under Art. I, § 7. Wells, supra at 204 (§ 7 
guarantees "notice and opportunity to be heard, which must be observed in order to have 
a valid proceeding affecting life, liberty, or property." "The general test for the validity 
of such rules, the test of procedural due process, is fairness.") (citations omitted). It 
cannot be argued that making material misrepresentations and omissions affords a fair 
process. See also Brief of Appellants, p. 50 and Reply Add. Exh. 1 at 42. 
B. Existing Remedies / Equitable Relief. 
The appellees do not argue that any federal remedies exist that would be adequate, 
or (as they argued in the trial court) that sufficient remedies are available through the 
Jensens' state common law claims. Appellees argue, however, that the Jensens could 
have appealed from the juvenile court. Appealed what? The final order of dismissal in 
their favor? The July 10 stipulation allowing them to seek independent testing, upon 
which the Jensens were relying? The July 28 oral ruling, for which minutes were not 
even available until August 11, after custody had already been transferred? 
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In any event, Wagner and Albritton's argument misapprehends the Jensens' 
claims, which do not seek reversal of the interlocutory or final juvenile court order, but 
rather damages for the defendants' constitutional violations. Utah juvenile courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction whose "powers are limited to those specifically conferred by 
the statute." In re B.B., 2004 UT 39, ^  19, 94 P.3d 252. None of its codified areas of 
jurisdiction would have allowed the juvenile court to entertain civil claims for money 
damages based upon violations of state and federal constitutional rights or state common 
law. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104 (2003)(setting forth jurisdiction of juvenile court). 
Wagner/Albritton argue that "the Jensens have failed to establish that equitable 
relief- such as an injunction, restraining order, or a motion to dismiss the removal 
proceeding - was wholly inadequate to protect their alleged right to direct Parker's 
medical care regardless of Parker's best interest." (Wagner/Albritton Brief at 68.) 
Ignoring the final clause (the Jensens wish that the appellees would show the courtesy of 
at least acknowledging the Jensens' actual argument), the appellees do not explain how 
one of those methods would have compelled them to stop making misrepresentations, or 
reimbursed Daren Jensen for his lost wages, or paid the Jensens' legal bills, or removed 
the handcuffs from Daren's wrists. 
The violation of constitutional rights cannot always be effectively remedied by 
injunctive relief. See Spachnan, 2000 UT 87, f 25. id, citing Bott ("if prisoners' rights 
under article I, section 9 are violated, injunctive relief may not be adequate to remedy 
prisoners' injuries") citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and Rockhouse 
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Mountain Property Owners Ass yn, Inc. v. Town of Conway, 503 A.2d 1385, 1388 (N.H. 
1986). In this case, there is no equitable relief that would make the Jensens whole. 
III. APPELLEES HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED ANY OTHER 
ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS FOR AFFIRMANCE OF THE 
JUDGMENT. 
The appellees briefly argue that, if the judgment cannot be sustained on res 
judicata, the Court should affirm on alternative grounds. It must be kept in mind that 
these arguments, by definition, hinge upon a review of the record, not the federal court's 
ruling. (Otherwise, the appellees would essentially be arguing, "If res judicata does not 
apply, please rule for us on these alternative grounds using res judicata.") 
A. Governmental immunity. 
The appellees first assert the alternative grounds of governmental immunity, 
another affirmative defense. Initially, appellees have not made a showing that 
governmental immunity would even apply to claims based upon self-executing state 
constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Heughs Land, L.L.C v. Holladay City, 2005 UT App 
202, Tfl[ 8-9, 113 P.3d 1024, and cases cited (governmental immunity is not a defense to 
claims under self-executing provision; "legislative power itself must be exercised within 
the framework of the constitution. Accordingly, it has been so long established and 
universally recognized, as to be hardly necessary to state, that if a statutory enactment 
contravenes any provision of the constitution, the latter governs") (citations omitted).) 
Second, appellees base this contention on an assertion that "[t]he federal court 
ruled that Dr. Wagner did not act with fraud or malice and did not lie under oath." 
(Wagner/Albritton Brief at 64.) (Actually, the federal court did not say that. The 
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appellees made no argument regarding governmental immunity to Judge Stewart.) In any 
event, if res judicata does not apply - hence the request for affirmance on an alternative 
ground - then it is obviously improper for appellees to rely on a res judicata-dependent 
argument as the sole support for this defense. 
If the Court entertains this alternative ground, its resolution requires review of the 
record - not only the additional cites offered by Wagner/Albritton, of course, but also the 
Jensens' conflicting citations, from which a jury could find that each of the appellees 
committed fraud and/or perjury. Moreover, that the defendants acted with malice may be 
inferred from their statements and from the very fact that they recklessly or intentionally 
made material misrepresentations. See, e.g., Potter v. Utah Driv-Ur-Self Sys., 11 Utah 2d 
133, 135, 355 P.2d 714 (1960) (malice may be implied from the wrongful act of filing a 
criminal complaint without reasonable justification for doing so). 
B. Judicial immunity. 
Eisenman seeks affirmance on the alternative ground that she is absolutely 
immunity for all of her actions in this case. In support of this contention, Eisenman relies 
primarily on statements by the federal court, which is obviously inappropriate when 
affirmance is sought on grounds not dependent upon res judicata. 
Eisenman has not established the absence of a question of fact on this affirmative 
defense. Utah recognizes judicial immunity for judicial officers and those individuals 
who perform "functions closely related to the judicial process." Sanders v. Leavitt, 2001 
UT 78, f 19, 37 P.3d 1052. "Whether a person or entity should be afforded judicial 
immunity depends upon the specific work or function performed," Bailey v. Utah State 
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Bar, 846 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Utah 1993), which is a fact-specific inquiry. Although 
judicial immunity extends to acts closely related to the judicial process, it does not extend 
to administrative or investigatory functions, Cline v. State Div. of Child and Family 
Services, 2005 UT App 498, f 40, 142 P.3d 127, or to wrongful misrepresentations and 
material factual omissions, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 
L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). A fact issue exists as to each of these issues.13 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set for above and in the Jensens' opening brief, the Jensens 
respectfully request the Court reverse the trial court's judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / C r » day of February, 2010. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Roger P. Christofhsen 
Karra J. Porter 
Sarah E. Spencer 
Attorneys for Appellants 
13
 Eisenman says that the Jensens' brief did not make any arguments regarding her (and 
therefore, apparently, cannot respond to her request for affirmance on an alternate 
ground.) SeeDCFS Defendants' Brief at 69. This argument is perplexing. The trial 
court's erroneous application of res judicata was the sole basis for dismissing all 
defendants. Accordingly, a reversal of that ruling necessarily includes Eisenman. The 
Jensens also specifically delineated each of Eisenman's alleged misrepresentations and 
other challenged actions, and then articulated for each section of the state constitution 
which- type(s) of conduct they believed violated that provision. In any event, appellants 
are not required to anticipate in their opening briefs arguments for affirmance on alternate 
grounds that a defendant might choose to make; appellants are entitled to argue, as the 
Jensens did, that the trial court's actual ruling is erroneous. 
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Addendum 
Exhibit 1 
uase ^UD-cv-uu/jy-i-'OO uocumeni o^ rneu uo/ ID/^UUD rayts i u i t / 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
P.J., a minor, by and through his parents and 
natural guardians, BARBARA and DAREN 
JENSEN; BARBARA JENSEN, individually; 
and DAREN JENSEN, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH; INTERMOUNTAIN 
HEALTH CARE, INC.; KARI 
CUNNINGHAM, in her individual capacity; 
RICHARD ANDERSON, in his individual 
and official capacities; LARS M. WAGNER, 
in his individual capacity; DAVTD L. 
COR WIN, in his individual capacity; 
CHERYL M. COFFIN, in her individual 
capacity; KAREN H. ALBRnTON, in her 
individual capacity; SUSAN EISENMAN, in 
her individual capacity; and JANE AND 
JOHN DOE, in their individual capacities, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
Case No. 2:05CV00739 PGC 
A months-long ordeal between plaintiffs Daren and Barbara Jensen and the State of Utah 
over medical care for P.J., the Jensens' minor son, began in 2003 when doctors at Primary 
Children's Medical Center diagnosed P.J. with Ewing's sarcoma. The Jensens asked for 
confirmatory tests, which were not immediately performed. The disputed diagnosis triggered an 
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neglect investigation by the State's Division of Child and Family Services because the Jensens 
refused to require P.J. to submit to chemotherapy. It also led to a juvenile court proceeding in 
which the Jensens lost legal custody of P. J. to the State. The case garnered widespread media 
interest, bringing the Jensens unwanted notoriety. Mr. and Mrs. Jensen eventually were indicted 
for kidnapping their own son. 
After months of wrangling, DCFS decided it could not force P.J. to submit to 
chemotherapy without parental support and moved the juvenile court to dismiss the case. The 
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office also dismissed the kidnapping charges against the Jensens in 
exchange for their plea in abeyance to a lesser misdemeanor charge of custodial interference. 
The Jensens then filed this civil rights action, seeking damages for alleged violations of 
the United States and Utah Constitutions, for wrongful initiation of criminal charges, and for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The crux of the Jensens' allegations is that DCFS 
employees, doctors, and attorneys in the Utah Attorney General's office maliciously mislead 
Utah courts in their efforts to force P.J. to submit to chemotherapy. They also allege that the 
juvenile court proceeds were conducted unfairly due to numerous misrepresentations and that the 
defendants' conduct led to unwarranted criminal proceedings against Mr. and Mrs. Jensen. 
Before the court are motions by the Jensens to certify a question to the Utah Supreme 
Court and by the defendants to dismiss the Jensens' claims. The court denies the Jensens' 
motion to certify; at this early stage, the court cannot confidently conclude that all the 
requirements in Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure are met. With respect to the 
motion to dismiss, the court is required to assume the truth of the Jensens' allegations. 
-2-
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Proceeding on the basis, and as more fully discussed below, the court grants the defendants' 
motion in these particulars: (1) all claims against the State of Utah fail because of sovereign 
immunity; (2) the Jensens' fourth and eighth causes of action fail to state a claim and must be 
dismissed as against all defendants; (3) the Jensens fail to state a claim against Richard Anderson 
in his official capacity; (4) plaintiff P.J. fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution or for 
denial of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in refusing medical care; and (5) all claims 
against Dr. Corwin and Dr. Coffin are dismissed because these two doctors are entitled to 
absolute immunity. The court denies the defendants' motions in all other respects. 
I. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard 
Defendants have moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The court may grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "only if it appears beyond a doubt that 
the plaintiff[s] [are] unable to prove any set of facts entitling [them] to relief under [their] theory 
of recovery."1 The court does not determine whether defendants actually did what the plaintiffs 
say they did — the law requires the court to "'accept as true all well-pleaded facts, as 
distinguished from conclusory allegations,'" in the Jensens' complaint.2 The court also "must 
view all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and the pleadings must be liberally 
construed" in the plaintiffs' favor.3 
lRuiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). 
2Beedle v. Wilson, All F.3d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Maker v. Durango 
Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
3i?w/z,299F.3datll81. 
-3-
Case 2:05-cv-00739-PGC Document 52 Filed 06/16/2006 Page 4 of 47 
These legal rules do not mean that if a court denies the motions to dismiss and thereby 
allows the lawsuit to continue that the defendants are automatically liable and that the plaintiffs 
will certainly win. "The issue in reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint is not whether the 
plaintiffs] will prevail, but whether the plaintiff[s] [are] entitled to offer evidence to support 
[their] claims."4 Thus, when resolving this type of motion, the court's job is essentially to ask: If 
everything the plaintiffs allege is true, do those allegations establish an injury that the law 
redresses? If the answer is yes, the case continues, allowing the plaintiffs to gather evidence that 
proves to a jury, beyond a preponderance of the evidence, that the allegations in their complaint 
are true. 
II. The State of Utah's Motion to Dismiss 
The Jensens named the State of Utah as a defendant in their fifth through tenth causes of 
action. Plaintiffs' fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth claims seek damages for violations of various 
provisions of the Utah Constitution. Their ninth and tenth claims seek tort damages. For the 
reasons explained more fully below, the court GRANTS the State's motion to dismiss these 
claims. 
A. Violations of the Utah Constitution 
The State argues that sovereign immunity bars the Jensens' Utah constitutional claims 
against it. The court agrees. 
In Spackman ex rel Spackman v. Board of Education, the Utah Supreme Court said that, 
except for one provision not applicable here, "the Utah Constitution does not expressly provide 
"Id 
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damages remedies for constitutional violations."5 Similarly, under Utah law, "there is no express 
statutory right to damages for one who suffers a constitutional tort."6 Accordingly, "a Utah 
court's ability to award damages for [a] violation of a self-executing constitutional provision 
rests on the common law."7 
At common law, the State was immune from suit. The Utah Supreme Court has said that 
"[s]overeign immunity was as a settled feature of the common law when Utah became a state and 
adopted its constitution."8 The Utah Supreme Court defined the common law doctrine of 
sovereign immunity in these terms: "'[I]n the absence of either express constitutional or statutory 
authority an action against a sovereign state cannot be maintained. The doctrine is elementary 
and of universal application, and so far as we are aware there is not a single authority to the 
contrary.'"9 
In this case, the Jensens have not pointed to "express constitutional or statutory authority" 
that waives Utah's sovereign immunity and permits claims against the State for violations of the 
specific Utah constitutional provisions cited in their complaint. The State's common law 
sovereign immunity thus bars the Jensens' constitutional claims against it. 
516 P.3d 533, 537 (Utah 2000). 
"Id. 
'Id. at 538. 
*Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 504 (Utah 1996). 
9Id (quoting Wilkinson v. State, 134 P. 626, 630 (Utah 1913)). 
-5-
Case 2:05-cv-00739-PGC Document 52 Filed 06/16/2006 Page 6 of 47 
B. Tort Claims 
Though the State has retained sovereign immunity for constitutional violations, the Utah 
Legislature has waived the State's immunity for certain tort claims. The Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act allows claims against the State "for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or 
omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment."10 The UGIA, however, 
waives immunity only for negligent, not for intentional, torts. The limits of this waiver are fatal 
to the Jensens' two tort causes of action — intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
wrongful initiation of process — because both are intentional torts.11 As such, the UGIA does 
not waive the State's immunity for these two causes of action. 
And even if these two causes of action could be classified as stemming from a State 
actor's negligence, the UGIA reinstates sovereign immunity in the circumstances alleged here. If 
a plaintiffs injury is "proximately caused by a negligent a c t . . . of an employee" but "arises out 
of, in connection with, or results from:... malicious prosecution,... abuse of process,. . . [or] 
infliction of mental anguish," that injury cannot form the basis for state liability.12 Since the 
Jensens' two tort causes of action arise out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and 
infliction of mental anguish, the UGIA bars these claims against the State. 
10&>eUtah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (2003). 
11
 See Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 535 (Utah 2002) (intentional 
infliction of emotional distress); Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d 357, 367 n.12 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (wrongful initiation of proceedings). 
l2See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2). 
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In sum, the court grants the State's motion and dismisses under Rule 12(b)(6) all of the 
Jensens' claims against it. The State has not waived sovereign immunity for its employees' 
intentional torts or their violations of the Utah Constitution. 
III. State Employees' Motion to Dismiss 
Defendants Richard Anderson, Susan Eisenman, and Kari Cunningham were all 
employees of the State of Utah when the events relevant to this lawsuit occurred. Mr. Anderson 
was DCFS's director. Ms. Eisenman was an assistant attorney general in the State's Attorney 
General's Office. Ms. Cunningham was a DCFS social worker. The court will address each 
argument these three defendants make in their motion, beginning with arguments applicable only 
to Anderson and Eisenman and then discussing arguments common to all three. 
A. Defendant Richard Anderson 
The Jensens sued Mr. Anderson in both his official and individual capacities. He argues 
that the court should dismiss the individual capacity claims because the Jensens have failed to 
plead a causal link between his conduct and any constitutional violations as § 1983 requires. He 
also argues that the official capacity claims should be dismissed because, in his official capacity, 
he is not a "person" for purposes of § 1983. The court holds that the individual capacity claims 
should not be dismissed but that the official capacity claims should be. 
1. Individual Capacity 
Mr. Anderson argues that the Jensens' § 1983 claims against him in his individual 
capacity should be dismissed because the Jensens failed to allege an "affirmative link" between 
his conduct and any constitutional violation. Mr. Anderson is correct that the Jensens may not 
-7-
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hold him liable merely because DCFS employees he supervises may have violated the Jensens' 
constitutional rights: "under § 1983, 'a defendant may not be held liable under a theory of 
respondeat superior.'"13 "Instead, '[the Jensens] must show that an affirmative link exists 
between the [constitutional] deprivation and either [Mr. Anderson's] personal participation, his 
exercise of control or discretion, or his failure to supervise.'"14 
The complaint sufficiently Mr. Anderson's personal involvement in this case by alleging 
that he flew to Idaho on September 15,2003, to negotiate with the Jensens and that he supported 
a September 5 stipulation between the Jensens and DCFS to have P.J. evaluated by an Idaho 
physician. The Jensens also allege that while in Idaho, Mr. Anderson said to Mr. Jensen, "We 
can tell that you're not a neglectful parent, but we just can't let you go."15 
As noted above, Rule 12(b)(6) requires the court to accept these factual allegations as 
true.16 The court also "must view all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and the 
pleadings must be liberally construed."17 The court may grant Mr. Anderson's motion "only if it 
appears beyond a doubt that" the Jensens are "unable to prove any set of facts entitling [them] to 
relief under [their] theory of recovery."18 These legal standards compel the court to deny Mr. 
l3Ledbetterv. CityofTopeka,3lSF3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Worrellv. 
Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1214 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
uId (citing Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1214). 
15Compl.tl57. 
16i?w/z,299F.3datll81. 
llId. 
lsId. (emphases added). 
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Anderson's motion to dismiss. The Jensens' complaint adequately alleges an affirmative link 
"between the [constitutional] deprivation and either . . . [Mr. Anderson's] exercise of control or 
discretion^ or his failure to supervise.'"19 The complaint alleges that Mr. Anderson's office had 
intensive, day-to-day involvement in the Jensens' case during 2003. A reasonable inference from 
the entire complaint — not just from the allegations that specifically mention Mr. Anderson — is 
that Mr. Anderson, as DCFS's director, personally participated in, exercised control or discretion 
over, or failed to supervise his employees' actions in the Jensens' case. 
Of course, allowing the claims against Mr. Anderson in his individual capacity to proceed 
does not mean that the Jensens will prevail. The Jensens have much more to prove before their 
claims against Mr. Anderson in his individual capacity could survive summary judgment, for at 
the summary judgment stage, unlike here, the issue is in fact "whether the plaintiff[s] will 
prevail," not just whether they have alleged that they will.20 At this stage, however, the Jensens 
may proceed with their claims. 
2. Official Capacity 
Mr. Anderson also seeks dismissal of all claims against him in his official capacity. His 
motion is based on the Tenth Circuit's holding that "[n]either the state, nor a governmental entity 
that is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, nor a state official who acts in his 
or her official capacity, is a 'person' within the meaning of § 1983."21 In addition to this Tenth 
l9Id. (citing Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1214). 
2lHarris v. Champion, 51 F.3d 901, 905-06 (10th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). 
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Circuit holding, the Supreme Court has held that "a suit against a state official in his or her 
official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. 
As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself."22 
The Jensens concede that their § 1983 claims against Mr. Anderson in his official 
capacity should be dismissed based on Harris v. Champion}3 They contend, however, that the 
remainder of their claims against Mr. Anderson (state constitutional violations and tort claims) 
"are cognizable in both capacities."24 This position fails to account for the Supreme Court's 
holding in Will v. Michican Department of State Police that claims against a state officer such as 
Mr. Anderson in his official capacity — regardless of the type of claim — are "no different" than 
claims against the State itself.25 The court therefore holds that the Jensens' tort and state 
constitutional claims against Mr. Anderson in his official capacity fail for the same reasons those 
claims fail as against the State of Utah. 
The Jensens fail to state a claim against Mr. Anderson in his official capacity upon which 
relief may be granted. The court therefore dismisses all such claims against him. 
B. Susan Eisenman 
Ms. Eisenman, sued in her individual capacity only, argues that she is entitled to absolute 
prosecutorial immunity from all the Jensens' claims. Absolute prosecutorial immunity extends 
22Will v. Mich. Dep 't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989) (citation omitted). 
23Pls.' Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss of Defs. Cunningham and Eisenman (Docket 
No. 36), Jensen v. Utah, Case No. 2:05-CV-739 PGC (D. Utah filed Jan. 17, 2006). 
24DocketNo.36,atlO. 
25491 U.S. at 70-71. 
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to prosecutors when they "perform[] the traditional functions of an advocate."26 But immunity 
does not extend to "those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an 
administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate.'"27 For example, in Kalina v. 
Fletcher, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity when 
she provided affidavit testimony in support of a criminal information and arrest warrant.28 The 
Court said that immunity did not attach because the prosecutor "performed an act that any 
competent witness may have performed."29 Thus, whether Ms. Eisenman is entitled to absolute 
immunity depends on whether the complaint alleges that her actions were prosecutorial or 
investigatory. 
The Jensens' memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss identifies three specific 
instances of investigatory conduct alleged in their complaint. First, they allege that Ms. 
Eisenman contacted Dr. Jeorg Birkmayer, an Austrian physician whom the Jensens had contacted 
to treat their son. Paragraph 104 of their complaint alleges that Ms. Eisenman e-mailed Dr. 
Birkmayer and asked, "As I am sure you are aware, the American Academy of Pediatrics has 
established a standard of care for pediatric cancer patients. Is there a similar standard of care for 
patients in Australia?" Second, the Jensens allege that Ms. Eisenman was a complaining witness 
in the juvenile court. Citing paragraphs 127 and 150 of their complaint, the Jensens claim that 
26Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997). 
11
 Id. at 125 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)). 
2
*See id. at 128-30. 
29Id at 129-30. 
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Ms. Eisenman made specific factual misrepresentations to the juvenile court regarding their 
alleged disobedience to the court's orders and their son's chance of survival without 
chemotherapy. Third, the Jensens allege in paragraphs 141 through 143 of their complaint that 
Ms. Eisenman was a complaining witness when she went to Salt Lake County and provided 
information that led to kidnapping charges against Mr. and Mrs. Jensen. 
In response to the Jensens' allegations that she was a complaining witness, Ms. Eisenman 
claims that she made all her statements to the juvenile court in her role as an advocate and not as 
a complaining witness. Her counsel also states that: 
To the extent any residual claims remain concerning the criminal [kidnapping] 
case against Barbara Jensen or Daren Jensen, without allegations that Ms. 
Eisenman was the affiant in support of their arrest warrant, a complaining witness 
referenced therein, or a prosecuting attorney, there is simply no affirmative link 
between her actions and any constitutional violation. Moreover, Plaintiffs could 
not make those allegations because Ms. Eisenman was not the affiant and is not to 
be found anywhere in either the Information or the Probable Cause Statement for 
Barbara Jensen or for Daren Jensen (attached as Exhibits 1 and 2).30 
The court reviewed Exhibits 1 and 2, the criminal informations charging Mr. and Mrs. 
Jensen with kidnapping. This statement appears on the second page of each exhibit: "THIS 
INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: T. Peterson, K. Cunningham, M. McDonald, S. Eisenman, P.J., and B. 
Nakamura."31 
30Docket No. 46, at 9-10 (emphasis added). 
3lSee id. Ex. 1 & 2, at 2 (emphasis added). 
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Her counsel conceded at oral argument that "S. Eisenman" was defendant Susan 
Eisenman but disputed the nature and extent of her involvement. Yet the question remains: did 
Susan Eisenman provide factual information to the District Attorney's office that led to criminal 
charges against Mr. and Mrs. Jensen? These exhibits create a question of fact about whether she 
did. Since the court must view all inferences in the Jensens' favor, these exhibits are sufficient to 
defeat Ms. Eisenman's claim to absolute prosecutorial immunity at this time. The plaintiffs, 
however, may proceed only as to the limited matters allegedly performed outside Eisenman's 
prosecutorial capacity. The court understands that such subjects would be relatively narrow. 
C. P.J. 's Individual Claims 
The State employees next claim that P.J. lacks standing to bring his § 1983 claims 
because he cannot show "an invasion of a legally protected interest."32 The Supreme Court has 
made clear that this requirement is a necessary predicate for Article HI jurisdiction to exist.33 But 
recent Tenth Circuit authority shows that defendants' arguments confuse standing with the merits 
of P.J.'s claims. The court will discuss this authority before addressing the employees' 
arguments. 
In Initiative & Referendum Institute v. Walker, the Tenth Circuit addressed a First 
Amendment challenge to a Utah Constitution amendment governing wildlife initiatives.34 The 
defendants argued that the plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the amendment. The circuit 
32Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 
U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993). 
33See id. (citing Lw/Vw v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
34No. 02-4105,2006 WL 1377028, at *1 (10th Or. May 17, 2006). 
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rejected that argument, stating that "[f]or purposes of standing, the question cannot be whether 
the Constitution, properly interpreted, extends protection to the plaintiffs asserted right or 
interest. If that were the test, every losing claim would be dismissed for want of standing."35 
Thus, "where the plaintiff presents a nonfrivolous legal challenge, alleging an injury to a 
protected right such as free speech, the federal courts may not dismiss for lack of standing on the 
theory that the underlying interest is not legally protected."36 
Here, P.J. alleges injuries to rights he claims are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The State employees' motion to dismiss turns on whether "the Constitution, properly interpreted, 
extends protection to [P.J.'s] asserted right or interest." If the court dismisses P.J.'s claims, it is 
because the Constitution does not protect the rights P.J. asserts — a quintessential merits 
question. Walker thus prohibits the court from dismissing P.J.'s claims for lack of standing. 
Instead, the court will construe the motion as one to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
1. Does P.J. Have a Substantive Due Process Right to Refuse Medical 
Treatment? 
The State employees attack P.J.'s first cause of action, labeled "Liberty interest / Due 
Process," which alleges that P.J. "had a clearly established fundamental right and liberty interest 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to 
Id. at *8. 
'Id. at *9. 
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refuse unwanted medical treatment."37 They argue that "P.J. could not refuse to consent to 
medical treatment; he consequently lacked a liberty interest in directing his own medical care."38 
This is a troubling proposition. Taken to its logical conclusion, accepting the defendants' 
argument would mean that all children, by virtue of their minority, would be incapable of 
refusing to consent to medical care and therefore would never, under any circumstances, have a 
constitutionally protected interest in refusing medical treatment. This would be a broad 
conclusion indeed. 
The defendants do not cite any case that holds that minors lack a Fourteenth Amendment 
right to refuse medical treatment. On the other hand, the cases the Jensens cite strongly imply 
(but do not hold) that a minor may have a liberty interest to refuse medical treatment. For 
instance, the Jensens cite Parham v. J.R., where Supreme Court held that a mentally challenged 
minor child had a liberty interest in "not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment."39 
A later case, however, clarified that Parham "certainly did not intimate that such a minor child, 
after commitment, would have a liberty interest in refusing treatment."40 Ultimately, Parham is 
not dispositive because it discussed liberty interests of minor children with mental health 
problems and was limited to unnecessary confinement, not unwanted treatment. Here, plaintiff 
37Compl.1[l89. 
38Doc. 24, at 7. 
39442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979). 
40Cruzan v. Missouri Dep 't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). 
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P.J. does not have a diagnosed mental illness and he refused treatment rather than 
institutionalization. 
P.J. also cites Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health. In Cruzan, the Supreme Court 
said that "[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest 
in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."41 The Court, 
citing Parham, also that "[s]till other cases support the recognition of a general liberty interest in 
refusing medical treatment."42 And later in its decision, the Court said, "[i]t cannot be disputed 
that the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment."43 Again, these cases — while instructive — are not dispositive 
because, with the exception of Parham, all involved adults rather than minors. 
The Jensens also cite Tenth Circuit precedent to show that P.J. has a liberty interest to 
refuse unwanted medical care. In Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., parents brought § 1983 claims for 
physical examinations of their children that allegedly violated the children's "right to refuse 
medical treatment."44 While the Tenth Circuit said that "[i]t is not implausible to think that the 
right[] invoked here — the right to refuse a medical exam . . . — fall[s] within this sphere of 
protected liberty,"45 it declined to resolve the issue and instead relied on the children's Fourth 
41497U.S.at278. 
42Id. 
43Id. at 281. 
^336 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Or. 2003). 
45Id. at 1203. 
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Amendment rights to resolve their claims.46 Dubbs is also inapposite because P.J., unlike the 
minors in Dubbs, was never searched or required to undergo treatment. 
Based on these cases, the court holds that a child as young as P.J. did not have his own 
right to refuse medical treatment. Instead, that right belongs to his parents. In other words, PJ. 's 
claim is subsumed by his parents' claim, at least under clearly established law. The court 
therefore grants the motion to dismiss the Jensens' first cause of action as to P.J. 
2. Familial Association 
The State employee defendants next incorrectly claim that minor children have no 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in familial association. In 1997, the Tenth Circuit 
decided J.B. v. Washington County.41 The two plaintiffs in that case were a mother and her 
minor child who sued under § 1983 for alleged violations of their substantive due process right to 
familial association.48 The Tenth Circuit said that "[plaintiffs' right to familial association is 
included in the substantive due process right of freedom of intimate association, which is 
'consonant with the right of privacy.'"49 The court also said that "[u]ndeniably, plaintiffs have a 
substantial interest in the right to associate with their family."50 The repeated use of the plural 
"plaintiffs," referring both to the mother and her minor daughter, shows that the right to familial 
"See id 
47127 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 1997). 
4 8&e/J.at927. 
A9Id. (quoting Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
50Id 
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association did not belong to the mother only. On this basis, the court holds that minor children 
have liberty interests in familial association that are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Defendants' argument as to this point fails. 
3. Malicious Prosecution 
Finally, the defendants ask the court to dismiss P.J.'s third cause of action, labeled 
"Fourth Amendment / Malicious prosecution." The court holds that P.J. fails to state a malicious 
prosecution claim and therefore grants defendants' motion. 
In Taylor v. Meacham, the Tenth Circuit said that it "takes the common law elements of 
malicious prosecution as the 'starting point' for the analysis of a § 1983 malicious prosecution 
claim, but always reaches the ultimate question, which it must, of whether the plaintiff has 
proven a constitutional violation."51 "[I]n the § 1983 malicious prosecution context, that 
constitutional right is the Fourth Amendment's right to be free from unreasonable seizures."52 
Here, P. J. fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution because his allegations do not 
establish each of that claim's four common law elements, which are : "(1) A criminal proceeding 
instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in 
favor of the accused; (3) absence of probable cause for the proceeding; (4) 'malice,' or a primary 
purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice."53 Since P.J. does not allege that the 
defendants instituted criminal proceedings against him, this claim fails. 
5182 F.3d 1556,1561 (10th Cir. 1996). 
52Id. 
53Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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And even if the court were to construe this claim as alleging a denial of P.J.'s Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures — without malicious prosecution 
overtones — the claims still fails. Of the "seizures" alleged, those applicable to P.J. are: (1) he 
was unable to travel freely, and (2) he was required to be physically present in court or at other 
specified locations on numerous occasions.54 Accepting these facts as true, these events do not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment. They are more properly addressed as violations of P.J. 's 
liberty interests, wrongs for which he seeks redress in his other causes of action. 
D. The Jensens State a Claim for Deprivation of Familial Association Rights. 
The State employee defendants next argue that the Jensens' familial association claim 
fails because the defendants' actions were not unduly burdensome or, alternatively, because the 
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The court disagrees with both assertions. 
The Jensens' "familial right of association is properly based on concept of liberty in the 
Fourteenth Amendment."55 The Tenth Circuit has held that "[t]o determine whether a person's 
familial association rights have been violated" requires "ca balancing [of] liberty interests against 
the relevant state interests.'"56 The question when weighing these interests is whether the State's 
conduct "constituted an undue burden on" the plaintiffs' associational rights.57 And "'[n]ot every 
statement or act that results in an interference with the rights of intimate association is 
54See Comply 199. 
55Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993). 
56Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)). 
57Id. 
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actionable.' The conduct or statement must be directed 'at the intimate relationship with 
knowledge that the statements or conduct will adversely affect that relationship.'"58 
On one side of the scale in this balancing test is the Jensens' "right to associate with 
[their] family," which "is a very substantial right."59 This right includes — but is not limited to 
— parents' right to direct their child's medical care. The Supreme Court has frequently 
"recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of their children,"60 for "'[fjamily relationships by their nature, involve deep attachments 
and commitments to the necessary few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special 
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs, but also distinctly personal aspects of one's 
life.'"61 
Opposite the Jensens' interests sits the State's "'traditional and transcendent interest' in 
protecting children from abuse and from situations where abuse might occur."62 Precedent 
clearly shows that "the state itself has a compelling interest in the health, education and welfare 
of children."63 
5SJ.B., 127 F.3d at 927 (quoting Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1548 (citation omitted)). 
59Gn#m, 983 F.2d at 1548. 
60Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (citing cases). 
6lJ.B., 127 F.3d at 927 (quoting Arnold v. Bd. ofEduc. of Escambia County, 880 F.2d 
305, 312-13 (11th Cir. 1989) (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
62Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1548 (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
^Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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This case presents the somewhat unusual situation where the parents' firm opinions about 
what treatment was best for their son did not coincide with the State's recommendations. 
Accepting the complaint's allegations as true, the Jensens agreed with the State all along that P.J. 
might well have cancer but wanted to confirm that it was Ewing's before subjecting him to the 
rigorous chemotherapy required to treat that specific cancer. The Jensens allege that the State 
refused to perform certain genetic tests that would have confirmed P.J.'s diagnosis of Ewing's. 
They also accuse the State defendants of acting in concert to maliciously remove P.J. from his 
parents' care and force him — against his will and his parents' wishes — to begin chemotherapy. 
And the complaint alleges that in 2003, the State deliberately made specific misrepresentations in 
Utah courts that led to the transfer P.J.'s legal custody to the State, eliminated PJ. 's ability to 
receive care from doctors of his parents' choice, and led to Mr. Jensen's arrest and criminal 
charges against Mr. and Mrs. Jensen. 
Despite the State's admittedly compelling interest in the health of its children, the court 
holds that, based on the complaint's allegations, the balancing tips in favor of the Jensens. Here, 
the parents' attempt to secure a reasonable confirmatory diagnosis was met first by stonewalling 
and then by misrepresentations to a court in order to secure the State's preferred treatment, all 
done with knowledge that the Jensens would be harmed. To be sure, these allegations are 
unproven. The court, however, must accept them as true, and on that basis holds that the familial 
association claim survives the defendants' motion to dismiss. 
For similar reasons, qualified immunity does not shield the State employees from liability 
for allegedly violating the Jensens' familial association rights. "When evaluating a qualified 
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immunity defense, after identifying the constitutional right allegedly violated, courts must 
determine whether the conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at 
the time it took place."64 Here, as discussed, the constitutional right is the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to familial association and right to direct the care of one's children. These 
rights were clearly established when the relevant events occurred during 2003.65 It was also 
clearly established in 2003 that the Jensens had the right not to be deprived of these liberty 
interests as a result of misrepresentations to state courts by government officials.66 The state 
actions alleged in the complaint — intentional factual misrepresentations and omissions to the 
state courts — could not have been objectively reasonable in light of this clearly established 
law.67 Because the court must accept the complaint's allegations as true, defendants are not 
entitled to qualified immunity for this claim at this early stage of the proceedings. 
E. The Jensens State a Procedural Due Process Claim. 
The employee defendants next argue that the Jensens cannot state a claim for procedural 
due process violations because the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee provides for '"the 
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'"68 The defendants 
"Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004). 
65See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (plurality opinion) (citing cases); see also J.B., 127 F.3d at 
927. 
"Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1297-99. 
67See id. 
^Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 
554(1965)). 
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argue that since the Jensens were afforded ample opportunity to be heard in the state juvenile 
proceedings, the procedural due process claims must fail. 
The defendants' reading of the Due Process Clause, though accurate, is incomplete. In 
addition to promising the right to be heard, "[t]he Due Process Clause also encompasses . . . a 
guarantee of fair procedure."69 Thus, the Due Process Clause requires more than notice and a 
hearing — the notice and hearing must also be fair. The complaint contains allegations that the 
State employees and the doctors intentionally misrepresented or omitted facts in the Jensens' 
case, including the status of allegedly confirmatory tests, to the Utah juvenile court.70 Thus, for 
purposes of this motion, the complaint adequately alleges a procedural due process violation. 
F. Malicious Prosecution Claim 
The State Defendants argue that, since the Jensens pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges 
of custodial interference, they cannot state a claim for malicious prosecution. The defendants 
assert that the Jensens' plea precludes them from proving a "favorable termination," a required 
element of a malicious prosecution claim.71 
At this early stage of the proceedings, the court finds the complaint pleads facts that could 
potentially support a finding that the Jensens' agreement to plead guilty was coerced through 
unfair means. In particular, the Jensens allege that felony charges were filed against them due to 
the defendants' intentional misrepresentations to the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office. 
69Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). 
10See, e.g., Comply 127. 
11
 See Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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Since the felony charges carried mandatory jail time, defendants' actions ensured that the Jensens 
would have to plead guilty to a lesser misdemeanor offense to avoid that jail time. If these 
allegations are correct, the Jensens' plea would not preclude their malicious prosecution action. 
G. Ninth Amendment Claim 
The Jensens' fourth cause of action seeks damages under § 1983 for alleged violations of 
the Ninth Amendment. The defendants argue that this cause of action fails to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. The court agrees and dismisses this cause of action. 
A number of courts have held that "the Ninth Amendment standing alone does not confer 
substantive rights for purposes of pursuing a constitutional claim. Specifically, section 1983 
civil rights claims premised on the Ninth Amendment must fail because there are no 
constitutional rights secured by that amendment."72 And the Tenth Circuit has never held that a § 
1983 action can be maintained solely on the basis of a Ninth Amendment violation. To the 
extent plaintiffs seek to vindicate alleged violations of their constitutionally protected familial 
association rights, they may properly seek redress under § 1983 based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
72Nicolette v. Caruso, 315 F. Supp. 2d 710, 718 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (citations and quotation 
marks omitted); see also Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); 
Clynch v. Chapman, 285 F. Supp. 2d 213 (D. Conn. 2003) (same); Coleman v. Parr a, 163 F. 
Supp. 2d 876 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (same); Basile v. Elizabethtown Area Sch. Dist, 61 F. Supp. 2d 
392 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (same); DeLeon v. Little, 981 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1997) (same); 
Williams v. Perry, 960 F. Supp. 534 (D. Conn. 1996) (same); Mann by Parent v. Meachem, 929 
F. Supp. 622 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); In re State Police Litigation, 888 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 
1995) (same); Rini v. Zwirn, 886 F. Supp. 270 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); Charles v. Brown, 495 F. 
Supp. 862 (N.D. Ala. 1980) (same). 
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H. State Law Claims 
As discussed above, the Jensens seek damages for alleged violations of the Utah 
Constitution and for state-law torts. The State employee defendants seek dismissal of both sets 
of claims. The court will first address the defendants' arguments regarding the Jensens' tort 
claims and then their arguments regarding the Jensens' Utah constitutional claims. 
1. Tort Claims Against the State or State Actors 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires a claimant to file a notice of claim with 
the proper state agency before suing the State or its employees. The required contents of a notice 
of claim are set by statute,73 and a proper notice of claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.74 
The State employee defendants argue that the court lacks jurisdiction over the Jensens' tort 
claims because their notice of claim fails to comply with the UGIA's provisions in two respects. 
First, the defendants argue that the notice of claim does not adequately state the nature of the 
claims asserted. Second, they argue that notice of claim fails to allege the individual defendants 
acted with fraud or malice. Both assertions are incorrect. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(3) states that a "notice of claim shall set forth:.. . the nature 
of the claim asserted."75 Defendants argue that the Jensens' notice of claim sets forth only an 
infliction of emotional distress claim, so the remainder of their claims must be dismissed. In 
'See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (2003). 
'Peeples v. State, 100 P.3d 254,256 (Utah Ct App. 2004). 
'Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(ii) (2003). 
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support of their argument, the defendants cite Yearsley v. Jensen J6 In Yearsley, the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed a district court's decision not to grant leave to amend a complaint where 
the plaintiff initially sought damages only for assault and battery but later sought to add a claim 
for malicious prosecution and unlawful arrest.77 The Utah Supreme Court held: "By no stretch of 
the facts can a claim for the physical beating be construed to include a claim for malicious 
prosecution."78 The court also said that the plaintiffs "only demand for damages was for 
physical and emotional distress arising from the physical beating. Not even an obscure reference 
was made to any other misconduct."79 The court concluded its discussion by stating, "a notice of 
assault and battery does not contemplate a malicious prosecution or a false arrest claim.. . . 
There must be enough specificity in the notice to inform as to the nature of the claim so that the 
defendant can appraise its potential liability."80 
Far from supporting the defendants' position, Yearsley cuts against it. Nowhere in 
Yearsley did the Utah Supreme Court require the plaintiff to list with exactitude the title of each 
cause of action. Instead, the court spoke of construed allegations, obscure references, and 
"enough specificity in the notice to inform as to the nature of the claim"*1 Indeed, the statute 
798 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990). 
7</. at 1129. 
lId. (emphasis added). 
}Id. (emphasis added). 
}Id. (emphasis added). 
{Id 
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itself requires only a description of the nature of the claim, not a specific, count-by-count listing 
of each cause of action sufficient to withstand scrutiny in a code pleading jurisdiction. 
After reviewing the Jensens' notice of claim, the court finds that it alleges facts from 
which defendants easily could have anticipated each of the Jensens' state constitutional and tort 
causes of action. And defendants admit that the infliction of emotional distress cause of action 
satisfies the notice of claim requirements.82 Since the notice of claim complies with § 63-30-
1 l(3)(a)(ii), defendants' first argument is without merit. 
Defendants' second argument — that the notice of claim fails to allege the individual 
defendants acted with fraud or malice83 — likewise fails. The defendants cite no Utah case 
holding that a notice of claim must not only describe conduct that is malicious or fraudulent but 
also must contain the specific words "malice" or "fraud." Utah courts define "actual malice" or 
"legal malice" as "conduct that manifests a reckless disregard or indifference to the rights and 
safety of others."84 The Jensens' notice of claim describes defendants' conduct in that fashion, 
including repeated alleged instances of knowingly making false statements to Utah courts to 
achieve their ends. This sufficiently alleges malice or fraud for purposes of the UGIA and 
permits the Jensens' state claims to proceed. 
-Docket No. 24, at 26. 
'See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4)(a) (2003). 
'Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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2. Utah Constitutional Violations 
The defendants also argue that the Jensens' Utah constitutional claims must be dismissed 
because the constitutional provisions allegedly violated are not self-executing. The court agrees 
in part with defendants' arguments. 
Damages are recoverable for violations of the Utah Constitution only if the provision 
violated is self-executing, and then only when three elements from Spackman ex rel Spackman v. 
Board of Education are met: (1) the plaintiff suffered a flagrant violation of constitutional rights; 
(2) existing remedies do not redress the plaintiffs injuries; and (3) equitable relief was and is 
wholly inadequate to protect the plaintiffs rights or redress the plaintiffs injuries.85 The Jensens 
allege that defendants violated four provisions of the Utah Constitution: (1) Article I, § 1, dealing 
with inherent and inalienable rights; (2) Article I, § 7, the Due Process Clause; (3) Article I, § 14, 
dealing with unreasonable searches and seizures; and (4) Article I, § 25, which reserves 
unenumerated rights to the people. For claims under these sections to be viable, the court must 
first determine whether these provisions are self-executing. If they are, the court must then 
decide whether the three-part test is satisfied. 
a. Are the Provisions Self Executing? 
Under Utah law, 
[a] constitutional provision is self-executing if it articulates a rule sufficient to 
give effect to the underlying rights and duties intended by the framers. In other 
words, courts may give effect to a provision without implementing legislation if 
the framers intended the provision to have immediate effect and if 'no ancillary 
legislation is necessary to the enjoyment of a right given, or the enforcement of a 
'Spackman ex rel Spackman v. Bd. ofEduc, 16 P.3d 533, 537-39 (Utah 2000). 
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duty imposed . . . . ' Conversely, constitutional provisions are not self-executing if 
they merely indicate a general principle or line of policy without supplying the 
means for putting them into effect.86 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that Article I, § 7 is self-executing,87 and 
defendants here assume that Article I, § 14 is self-executing. The two contested provisions are 
therefore §§1 and 25 of Article I. Based on the Spackman rule quoted above, the court holds 
that Article I, § 1 is self-executing. This section states: "All men have the inherent and 
inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties;... and petition for redress of 
grievances . . . ,"88 Utah citizens' ability to enjoy their "inherent and inalienable right to enjoy 
and defend their lives and liberties" is not contingent upon implementing legislation. 
In contrast, the court holds that Article I, § 25 is not self-executing. This provision states: 
"This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the 
people."89 Section 25 is very similar to the Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which 
the court has already held cannot by itself provide the basis for a § 1983 claim. And § 25 is more 
of a "general principle or line of policy without" that does not "supply[] the means for putting [it] 
into effect.5'90 Accordingly, the Jensens' eighth cause of action (based on Article I, § 25) fails to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted and must be dismissed. 
sId at 535 (quoting Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996)). 
7See id. at 536. 
*Utah Const, art. I, § 1. 
'Id. artL, §25. 
^packman, 16 P.3d at 535 (quotation marks omitted). 
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b. Are Money Damages Available for the Self-Executing Provisions? 
Though §§ 1,7, and 14 of Article I are self-executing, the court must still determine 
whether damages are appropriate for violations of these sections. The answer to this question 
depends on whether the complaint's allegations establish these three elements from Spackman: 
"[f]irst, a plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered a 'flagrant' violation of his or her 
constitutional rights"; "[s]econd, a plaintiff must establish that existing remedies do not redress 
his or her injuries"; and "[t]hird, a plaintiff must establish that equitable relief, such as an 
injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect the plaintiffs rights or redress his or her 
• • * 5591 
injuries. 
Based on these factors, the court holds that, at this early stage of the litigation, it cannot 
say with certainty that damages would be inappropriate. The alleged violations of these sections 
appear to be "flagrant" and equitable relief was and is "wholly inadequate" to redress these 
wrongs; Spackman's first and third elements are therefore satisfied. Spademan's second element, 
however, is the difficult one. The Jensens spend considerable time discussing how their state 
claims differ from their federal claims, but they spend little time demonstrating that existing 
remedies, under § 1983 and other bodies of law, are inadequate to redress the injuries they 
suffered. Likewise, the state refers only generally to § 1983 as providing sufficient 
{Id. at 538-39. 
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compensation, not perhaps appreciating that whether the federal cause of action under § 1983 
provides sufficient redress for a state constitutional claim is an open question in Utah.92 
The court is well aware that it must "use [its] common law remedial power cautiously and 
in favor of existing remedies."93 That determination, however, must be made with a precise 
understanding of the nature of a plaintiff s injuries and the remedies available to address them. 
The court can have only a general understanding of the plaintiffs injuries at this point in the 
process, and therefore any firm determination of this issue is premature. Accordingly, the court 
denies the motion to dismiss the Jensen's remaining state constitutional law claims, believing 
that as this litigation progresses the remedies issue will come into clearer focus. 
IV. The Doctor Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
The Jensens have asserted claims against Dr. Lars Wagner, Dr. David Corwin, Dr. Cheryl 
Coffin, and Dr. Karen Albritton — doctors at Primary Children's Medical Center — for their role 
in the events of 2003. These defendants filed a separate motion to dismiss. Where the doctor 
defendants' and State employee defendants' arguments overlap, the court will refer to its earlier 
discussion. 
A. Collateral Estoppel 
The doctor defendants first argue that the Jensens are estopped from bringing their claims 
because they were all addressed in the juvenile court proceedings. In their opening 
92See Spackman, 16 P.3d at 538 n.10 ("We do not reach the question of whether existing 
federal law remedies should preclude a state court from awarding damages for a state 
constitutional tort."). 
93Id. at 539. 
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memorandum, the doctors invoked collateral estoppel as the relevant estoppel species. In the 
doctors' reply memorandum, however, collateral estoppel had evolved into judicial estoppel. 
A legal theory may not make its first appearance in a reply memorandum. "A reply 
memorandum must be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum opposing the 
motion . . . ,"94 And failure to raise an issue in an opening memorandum constitutes waiver of 
that issue.95 So to the extent judicial estoppel differs from collateral estoppel, the court will 
disregard those differences and base its ruling on collateral estoppel only — the issue defendants 
raised in their opening memorandum. 
Under Utah law, the four elements of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion are: 
[1] [T]he party against who issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party to 
or in privy with a party to the prior adjudication; [2] the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant action; [3] the 
issue in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and 
[4] the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.96 
Since the court at this stage of the proceedings must accept the complaint's allegations as 
true, the court finds that juvenile court proceedings in 2003 do not collaterally estop the Jensens' 
claims. Specifically, the second and third elements are not met. This case concerns whether 
events before and during the juvenile court proceedings violated the Jensens' rights under the 
Utah and United States Constitutions — issues the juvenile court did not consider. And the 
94DUCivR7-l(b)(3). 
95
 See King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1091 n.2 (10th 
Cir. 1999); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994); Codner 
v. United States, 17 F.3d 1331, 1332 (10th Cir. 1994). 
96Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678, 686 (Utah 2005) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
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Jensens' complaint is replete with allegations that the issues were not fairly litigated because of 
fraud and deceit. These allegations, which the court must accept as true, prevent a finding that 
the earlier proceedings were "fully[] and fairly litigated."97 The court therefore denies this 
portion of the doctor defendants' motion to dismiss. 
B. The Jensens' § 1983 Claims 
1. Substantive Due Process 
The doctors characterize the Jensens' complaint as asserting a "right to absolute parental 
autonomy... to raise their child free from any state interference" and argue that the United 
States Constitution does not protect such a right. The doctors mischaracterize the Jensens' claim. 
The complaint does not, as the doctors assert, allege the right to be absolutely free from state 
interference. Rather, it seeks to vindicate allegedly unconstitutional deprivations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment interests identified earlier as the right to familial association and a 
parent's right to direct the care and upbringing of children. As discussed in above, the 
Constitution protects these rights, and the complaint's allegations are sufficient to survive a 
motion to dismiss. 
2. Substantive Due Process Violations Pleaded as to Each Doctor 
The doctors next argue that the complaint fails to state a claim for substantive due process 
violations against them because their alleged conduct does not "shock the conscience of federal 
judges."98 Based on recent Tenth Circuit precedent, this standard does not apply in this case. 
!Docket No. 18 (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1997)). 
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In Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., a district court dismissed parents' substantive due process 
claims (that were very similar to those the Jensens allege here) because the conduct alleged did 
not "shock the conscience of the court."99 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that "the district 
court misapprehended the legal standard applicable to purported substantive due process rights 
that — like the right to consent to medical treatment for oneself and one's minor children — may 
be 'objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'"100 The circuit continued: 
"While the 'shocks the conscience' standard applies to tortious conduct challenged under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it does not exhaust the category of protections under the Supreme 
Court's substantive due process jurisprudence, or eliminate more categorical protection for 
'fundamental rights' as defined by the tradition and experience of the nation."101 Though the 
circuit ultimately "decline[d] to resolve the difficult questions regarding the standard to be 
applied to this claim because the district court gave only cursory treatment to the parents' 
substantive due process claims," its discussion strongly indicates that the "shock the conscience" 
standard does not govern the Jensens' claims. 
Rather than applying the "shocks the conscience" standard here, the court takes its cue 
from the Tenth Circuit's cite to Washington v. Glucksberg, which in turn cited Reno v. Flores for 
the proposition that government conduct that infringes upon fundamental liberty interests (such 
'336 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Or. 2003). 
)0Id at 1203 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)). 
nId. (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-51 (1998)). 
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as the Jensens' claimed liberty interests here) is unconstitutional "'unless the infringement is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'"102 The court will apply this standard. 
Before reaching the merits, the court acknowledges the seemingly inconsistent standards 
mandated by Dubbs and Griffin. In Section III.D, the court responded to the State employee 
defendants' motion to dismiss by applying Griffin, which mandates a "balancing test" and a hunt 
for an "undue burden" when liberty interests such as familial association are at issue.103 Dubbs, 
in contrast, points to the "narrowly tailored / compelling interest" test for substantive due process 
rights (such as a parent's right to direct a child's medical care) that "may be 'objectively, deeply 
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'"104 The right to enjoy familial association arguably 
is as deeply rooted in this Nation's history as a parent's right to direct medical care. So on one 
level, it makes little sense to assign different tests to these two rights based on labels like "liberty 
interest" versus "substantive due process right" — particularly where the Tenth Circuit has 
previously held that the familial right of association is in fact a subset of a substantive due 
process right.105 
One possible explanation for this apparent discrepancy is that Glucksberg's rule, 
identified Dubbs, that "the Fourteenth Amendment 'forbids the government to infringe . . . 
"fundamental" liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement 
mGlucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). 
mGriffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993). 
mDubbs, 336 F.3d at 1205 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21). 
105Gn#m, 983 F.2d at 1547. 
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is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest"'106 supercedes the balancing test/undue 
burden requirement from Griffin. Perhaps another explanation is that finding an "undue burden" 
is equivalent to finding that no compelling state interest exists, or that the State's means were not 
narrowly tailored. But this seems unlikely, particularly because the Supreme Court recently 
applied the narrowly tailored/compelling state interest standard in a substantive due process 
case107 despite the existence and applicability of the "undue burden" standard to other substantive 
due process rights.108 If the two tests were identical, the continued distinction would be of no 
use. 
One certainty emerges from this tangled web of apparent substantive due process 
inconsistencies: this court is not the proper entity to resolve this debate. The court is bound by 
Tenth Circuit precedent. Both Dubbs and Griffin appear to be good law, so the court will apply 
two different tests — the balancing test to the motion to dismiss the associational claims, and the 
narrowly tailored/compelling state interest test to the motion to dismiss the substantive due 
process claim for invasion of the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care. 
As to the latter, the doctors claim that they did not infringe the Jensens' substantive due 
process rights because they merely diagnosed P.J.'s condition and reported Mr. and Mrs. Jensen 
to DCFS as Utah law required after the Jensens failed to enroll their son in chemotherapy. The 
Jensens, in turn, accuse the doctors of violating the Jensens' substantive due process rights by, 
106521U.S.at721. 
107
 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003). 
mPlanned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-78 (1992). 
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among other things, misrepresenting P.J.'s condition to the juvenile court, refusing to order 
specific medical tests that would have conclusively identified P.J.'s cancer, and ignoring or 
misrepresenting evidence that was inconsistent with their diagnosis. 
Since these arguments appear in a motion to dismiss, and since the Jensens have alleged 
numerous misrepresentations, the court must hold that the Jensens' complaint adequately alleges 
a substantive due process violation. There is no compelling state interest in falsifying or 
misrepresenting evidence to a juvenile court. But it should go without saying that this holding 
assumes the doctors actually did what plaintiffs allege; to survive summary judgment, the 
Jensens must put forth evidence in support of their claims. 
3. P.J.'s Liberty Interests 
In Section IH.C.l, the court held that, under the facts of this case, P.J. had no liberty 
interest in refusing medical treatment. The court grants this portion of the doctors' motion to 
dismiss for the same reasons discussed in that section. 
4. Procedural Due Process 
Like the State employee defendants, the doctor defendants argue that the Jensens fail to 
state a claim for deprivation of procedural due process. In particular, the doctors argue that the 
most detailed allegations of procedural due process violations relate to the State defendants' 
actions. They assert that the Jensens' failure to provide specific allegations as to each doctor is 
fatal to this claim. 
The trouble with this argument is that it ignores Tenth Circuit precedent. In Northington 
v. Marin, the circuit discussed tort law principles of joint and several liability and then said, 
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"[t]hese rules apply in § 1983 actions. Persons who concurrently violate others' civil rights are 
jointly and severally liable for injuries that cannot be apportioned."109 
Here, the complaint implicates all defendants — the State employees and the doctors — 
in its allegations of constitutional deprivations. The injuries the Jensens assert as a result of the 
alleged failure to conduct confirmatory tests and misrepresentations to the Utah court "cannot be 
apportioned." This case seems to fit squarely within the rule from Northington; as such, the 
court denies the doctors' motion to dismiss the procedural due process claim. 
5. Ninth Amendment 
The doctors, like the State defendants, ask the court to dismiss the Jensens' Ninth 
Amendment claim. The court grants this motion for the same reasons outlined in Section IH.G 
above. 
6. Malicious Prosecution 
The doctors next ask the court to dismiss the Jensens' § 1983 and state tort malicious 
prosecution claims because the Jensens' pleas in abeyance preclude them from establishing the 
"favorable termination" element of these causes of action. As noted above, it is too early in the 
proceedings to determine with certainty whether the Jensens' plea agreement was procured by 
unfair means. If so, this element may be satisfied. The court therefore DENIES this motion for 
the same reasons discussed in Section III.F above. 
102 F.3d 1564, 1569 (10th Cir. 1996). 
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D. Absolute Immunity 
The doctors claim they are entitled to absolute immunity for all the Jensens' cognizable 
claims because they "were integral parts of the judicial process"110 — that is, their actions were 
allegedly limited to those mandated by law (reporting their diagnosis, P.J.'s condition, and the 
Jensens' decision to the State) and to participation in the juvenile court proceedings.111 The 
doctors thus seek protection under Brisco v. LaHue's wide grant of "integral" immunity. The 
court agrees in part with this assertion. 
When deciding whether a defendant is absolutely immune from suit, this court must 
"apply a 'functional approach . . . which looks to the nature of the function performed, not the 
identity of the actor who performed it.'"112 "'The more distant a function is from the judicial 
process, the less likely absolute immunity will attach.'"113 For this reason, malicious prosecution 
defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity if they were complaining witnesses — "the 
person (or persons) who actively instigated or encouraged the prosecution of the plaintiff'114 — 
whose "testimony [was] relevant to the manner in which" the plaintiffs prosecution was initiated 
or perpetrated.115 
mBriscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983). 
ln&>eDocketl8,at38. 
U2Malikv. Arapahoe CountyDep'tof Soc. Servs., 191 F.3d 1306, 1314(10th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993)). 
mId. (quoting Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 687 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
xuAnthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395, 1399 n.2 (10th Cir. 1992). 
n5Id. at 1401. 
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In this case, the complaint alleges that Dr. Wagner's and Dr. Albritton's testimony 
instigated or encouraged the Jensens' juvenile court case and was relevant to the manner in 
which those proceedings occurred. The Jensens specifically allege that these doctors did not act 
in good faith — they allege that Dr. Wagner refused to order tests that would have confirmed the 
Ewing's sarcoma diagnosis, and that he threatened them by stating, "If you don't come in for 
treatment, I will take your son." And they allege that Dr. Albritton made several factual 
misrepresentations and omissions to the juvenile court during the courts of the proceedings. If 
these facts are tine — as the court must assume on this motion to dismiss — these two doctors 
are not entitled to absolute immunity. 
On the other hand, Dr. Corwin and Dr. Coffin did not "initiate or perpetuate the 
prosecution." Accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint as true, Dr. Corwin attempted to 
mediate the dispute between the Jensens and PCMC, and Dr. Coffin diagnosed P.J.'s disease. 
Dr. Corwin and Dr. Coffin are therefore entitled to absolute immunity. 
E. Qualified Immunity 
The doctors invoke qualified immunity as a separate defense. Since the court has held 
that Dr. Wagner and Dr. Albritton are not absolutely immune, it will examine whether these two 
doctors are qualifiedly immune from suit. 
As discussed in above, the qualified immunity test consists of two parts: first, do the facts 
as alleged show the violation of a constitutional right? And second, was that right clearly 
established?116 A right is clearly established when its contours are "sufficiently clear that a 
n6See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). 
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reasonable official would know that what he is doing violates that right."117 If the answer to 
either question is "no," the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. 
1. Substantive Due Process 
The doctors first claim they are qualifiedly immune from the Jensens' substantive due 
process claims. They do not concede the first element but jump directly to the second and argue 
that the Jensens' alleged constitutional rights were not clearly established. 
Rather than skip the first inquiry, the court holds that the facts as alleged here violate the 
Jensens' Fourteenth Amendment rights for the reasons discussed above. As to the second 
element, these rights were clearly established in 2003. Defendants' arguments to the contrary are 
misplaced because they focus solely on the Utah law that required them to report instances of 
suspected abuse or neglect. But the report itself is not the issue. Whatever reporting 
requirements Utah law imposed, the law obviously did not require them to threaten the Jensens, 
refuse to perform confirmatory tests, or make false, incomplete, or misleading statements to Utah 
courts, as the Jensens allege they did, with knowledge that these actions would curtail the 
Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s care and harm their family. Whether this conduct actually occurred 
is a vigorously disputed issue of fact to be determined later — the court must accept these 
allegations as true at this early stage. And based on these allegations, qualified immunity is 
inappropriate because the doctors' actions violated clearly established law. 
JId. (quotation marks omitted). 
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2. Procedural Due Process 
The doctors also argue that they did not violate the Jensens' procedural rights by 
diagnosing P.J., reporting potential neglect, and testifying in juvenile proceedings. Assuming 
without deciding that the doctors' position is correct, they again misunderstand the nature of the 
Jensens' claim, which goes to the fairness of those proceedings.118 The plaintiffs allege that Dr. 
Wagner and Dr. Albritton made multiple factual misrepresentations during these events. Such 
omission or falsehoods would undoubtedly affect the fairness of the proceedings. Based on these 
alleged facts, qualified immunity is inappropriate. 
F. Violations of the Utah Constitution 
The doctors next ask the court to dismiss the Jensens' Utah Constitution claims because 
the provisions allegedly violated "do not substantially differ from their federal counterparts."119 
Their argument is based on State v. Harris, where the Utah Supreme Court said, "[w]e 
acknowledge that as a general rule, we will not engage in a state constitutional analysis unless an 
argument for different analyses under the state and federal constitution is briefed."120 
Defendants' argument is misplaced for at least two reasons. First, the sentence in Harris 
immediately following the one quoted above reads: "However, we apply this rule in cases where 
a party relies nominally on state constitutional provisions while actually relying on the parallel 
^See supra Section HIE; Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). 
'Docket No. 18, at 43. 
'104 P.3d 1250, 1258 (Utah 2004) (brackets and quotation marks omitted). 
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federal constitutional provisions and analysis based on them."121 When drafting their complaint, 
the Jensens relied equally on the United States and Utah constitutions: four causes of action were 
based on each. To this point, then, there has been no "nominal" reliance on the state constitution. 
The second problem is related to the first. Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
their Utah counterparts require only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief."122 At this early stage, it would be premature for the court to dismiss 
the Jensens' state constitutional claims for lack of detailed briefing when the complaint satisfies 
notice pleading requirements. 
That said, the court's holding in response to the State defendants' motion to dismiss — 
that Article I, § 25 is not self-executing — applies with equal force to the doctors. The court 
therefore dismisses the Jensens' eighth cause of action as against the doctors. 
G. Utah Tort Claims 
Finally, the doctors ask the court to dismiss the Jensens' tort causes of action. To the 
extent their arguments overlap with the State defendants', the court denies their motion for the 
same reasons already discussed. 
The doctors also argue a few distinct points. First, they cite Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 
for the proposition that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not waive immunity for 
causes of action arising out of "infliction of mental anguish." This language, which appears in 
the subsection the doctors cite, must be read in context. The entire statute reads: "Immunity jfrom 
mId. (brackets and quotation marks omitted). 
122Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). 
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suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or 
omission of an employee except if the injury arises out of . . . infliction of mental anguish."123 
The Act defines a governmental entity as "the state and its political subdivisions as defined in 
this chapter."124 Thus, by its plain language, the statute does not concern the liability (or 
immunity) of individuals such as the doctors, but rather the political subdivisions of the state. 
The doctors next argue that the Jensens fail to state a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress because they fail to plead that the doctors acted with the "purpose" of 
inflicting emotional distress. Pleading a "purpose" of inflicting emotional distress is one option 
for establishing the first element of this cause of action, but a plaintiff may also state a claim by 
alleging the defendant "acted in reckless disregard of the likelihood ofcausing[] emotional 
distress."125 The Jensens' complaint sufficiently alleges "reckless disregard" to survive a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. And it also adequately alleges the second prong, "outrageous and intolerable" 
conduct.126 "It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct 
may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery."127 The court 
finds that facts alleged in the complaint satisfy this standard. 
123Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(3) (2003). 
mId. § 63-30-2(3) (2003). 
l25Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 535 (Utah 2002) (emphasis added). 
mSchuurman v. Shingleton, 26 P.3d 227, 233 (Utah 2001). 
121
 Id. (brackets and quotation marks omitted). 
-44-
Case 2:05-cv-G0739-PGC Document 52 Filed 06/16/2006 Page 45 of 47 
V. Motion to Certify 
The final motion before the court is the Jensens' motion to certify the following question 
to the Utah Supreme Court: 
Have plaintiffs' Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action adequately 
alleged a claim under the Utah state constitution within the meaning of Spackman 
v. Board of Education, 2000 UT 87,16 P.3d 533 (2000)?128 
Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides the mechanism by which this 
court may certify a question of law to the Utah Supreme Court. The rule requires this court to 
submit a certification order to the Utah Supreme Court that states: (1) the question of law to be 
answered; (2) that the question certified is a controlling issue of law in this proceeding; and (3) 
that there appears to be no controlling Utah law.129 
This court may certify a question of law to the Utah Supreme Court, but it need not do so 
each time "there is doubt as to local law."130 As the Supreme Court has stated: 
In the absence of some recognized public policy or defined principle guiding the 
exercise of the jurisdiction conferred, which would in exceptional cases warrant 
its non-exercise, it has from the first been deemed to be the duty of the federal 
courts, if their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to decide questions of state law 
whenever necessary to the rendition of a judgment.131 
128Pls.' Mot. to Certify Question of Law to Utah Supreme Court (Docket No. 32), at 2, 
Jensen v. Utah, Case No. 2:05-CV-00739 PGC (D. Utah filed Jan. 9,2006). 
129UtahR.App.P.41(c). 
mLehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974). 
mMeredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). 
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And the Tenth Circuit has emphasized the Supreme Court's teaching that '"[n]ovel, unsettled 
questions of state law, however, not "unique circumstances," are necessary before federal courts 
may avail themselves of state certification procedures.'"132 
The Jensens' motion comes very early in these proceedings. At this early point, the court 
cannot conclude that the question they want certified presents a controlling issue of Utah law — 
Rule 41(c)'s second element. And it is unclear whether Rule 41(c)'s third element, an absence of 
controlling Utah law, is met. The court therefore denies the Jensens' motion to certify. 
CONCLUSION 
The court GRANTS the State of Utah's motion to dismiss (# 25) and DISMISSES the 
State as a defendant. All claims against it fail because of sovereign immunity. 
The court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the State employees' and doctors' 
motions to dismiss (# 17, # 23). The Jensens' fourth cause of action (based on the Ninth 
Amendment) and eighth cause of action (based on Article I, § 25 of the Utah Constitution) fail to 
state claims upon which relief may be granted. The court thus GRANTS defendants' motion and 
DISMISSES these two claims against all defendants. The court also GRANTS defendant 
Richard Anderson's motion to dismiss all claims against him in his official capacity for this same 
reasons it dismisses the claims against the State of Utah. The court GRANTS defendants' 
motion to dismiss P.J.'s malicious prosecution claim against all defendants because he fails to 
allege that he was prosecuted. And the court GRANTS defendants' motion to dismiss P.J.'s first 
l32Copier ex rel Lindsey v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 838 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997)). 
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cause of action because, under the facts of this case, he had no liberty interest in refusing medical 
treatment. The court also holds that Dr. Corwin and Dr. Coffin are entitled to absolute 
immunity; the court therefore GRANTS their motion and DISMISSES all claims against them. 
The court DENIES the defendants' motions in all other respects. 
Finally, the court DENIES the Jensens' motion to certify (# 32) at this early stage of the 
proceedings. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 16th day of June, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
Paul G. Cassell 
United States District Judge 
-47-
Addendum 
Exhibit 2 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
BARBARA JENSEN, Et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, KARI 
CUNNINGHAM, Et al., 
Defendants. 
-0O0-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 26th day of January 
2009, commencing at the hour of 9:03 a .m., the above-entitled 
matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE JOSEPH C. 
FRATTO, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the 
purpose of this cause, and that the following proceedings were 
had. 
-oOo-
Case No. 050912502 CR 
MOTION HEARING 
1 
A P P E 
For the Plaintiffs: 
For the Defendants, 
Cunningham and Eisenman: 
For the Defendant, 
Eisenman: 
For the Defendant, 
Cunningham: 
For the Defendant, 
Wagner: 
For the Defendant: 
Anderson: 
A R A N C E S 
KARRA J. PORTER 
SARA SPENCER 
ROGER P. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys at Law 
Christensen & Jensen 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, #4 00 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
SCOTT D. CHENEY 
BRIDGET K. ROMANO 
Assistant Attorneys General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JONI J. JONES 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ANDREW M. MORSE 
R. SCOTT YOUNG 
DAVID G. WILLIAMS 
Attorneys at Law 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
KRISTIN A. VANORMAN 
Attorney at Law 
Strong & Hanni 
3 Triad Center, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
* * * 
2 
memorandum. I--I looked at--
THE COURT: Well, I wonder--Mr. Morse, I wonder if 
you can tell me, is there--is there an ability here to sort of 
make an overview as to--as to why this is a res judicata? 
What's--I mean, this is a transfer, if that's the correct 
phrase, from the Federal Court to this Court. 
MR. MORSE: Correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MORSE: I, frankly, don't know what the 
difference would be between res judicata and law of the case. 
They both bar the plaintiffs' claims here. 
The plaintiffs have pointed out, and I think 
technically correctly, that res judicata, technically, may not 
apply within the same case. What they failed to tell you in 
that same case of Kerr McGee is that law--law of the case does 
bar their claims. It's the same rule. You have one bite at 
the apple and trial judges are not permitted to second-guess 
what another trial judge does within the same case. 
You would be no more able to second-guess Judge 
Dever than you would Judge Stewart, even though Stewart is in 
a different Fed--a different court system. 
The--the--if the plaintiffs do not like what 
happened at the trial court in--across the street in Federal 
Court, they're free to file an appeal, which is what they've 
done. 
T 
seriously. 
At 3 no time < lid he say yes, we accept it as true, we, 
you know, take that as a higher authority than a different 
institution, there is 
that that allegation . 
THE 
there. Your 1 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
Ms. 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
MS, 
briefing and 1 
COURT: 
time has 
no evidence whatsoever that that would--
is true. 
Ms. Vanorman, I'm going to stop you 
expired. 
VANORMAN: All right. Thank you. 
COURT: I think I understand your appreciate. 
VANORMAN: Thank you. 
COURT: 
Porter? 
PORTER: 
COURT: 
PORTER: 
COURT: 
PORTER: 
COURT: 
PORTER: 
Erom the 
defendants place most 
The 
there are two 
problem 
Appreciate your argument. Thank you. 
Thank you, your Honor. 1 
For the plaintiff. 
Pardon? 
For the plaintiff. 
Yes. 
Plaintiffs. 
Your Honor, it is obvious from both the 1 
argument that we've heard today that the 
of their eggs in a res judicata basket. 
is, res judicata does not apply unless 1 
separate cases. It's pretty obvious, when you 
look at all of our case law, that's just not an argument that 
they have available to them. 
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The--so, what happens then is, recognizing that we 
were correct on that, two arguments were made in reply memos; 
one was, well, okay, issue preclusion anyway, can't we still 
argue that? And citing the Oman case. No, actually, if you 
look at the Oman case, that case involved two subsequent 
cases. 
And there's a reason for that, your Honor, you know 
it's a well-established principle of res judicata that any 
claims that, whether they were made or could have been made, 
you know, once the case is over, then those cas--those claims 
are precluded. So, thatfs why there's the two-case 
requirement for that. 
And that--and the defendants have--some have 
conceded, some have just simply not cited any authority to the 
contrary that we're right, res judicata not available here. 
So, what happens is, in the reply memo, for the 
first time, first time the words have ever been uttered by any 
of the defendants is in the reply memo. And they say, well, 
you know, okay, maybe res judicata doesn't really apply here 
but we--we should have argued law of the case. 
It was kind of interesting because of the defense 
counsel said, we didn't attempt--the plaintiffs did not 
attempt to argue any of the exceptions to the law of the case 
doctrine, so we were basically agreeing with them. How would 
we? The first time we even saw it or had any inkling that 
18 
1 they were going to argue this was Friday afternoon in their 
2 reply memorandum. 
3 So, there are some--several problems with this 
4 attempt and I'm going to explain how we have severely 
5 prejudiced if they are allowed to even argue law of the case. 
6 THE COURT: Let me ask this--
7 MS. PORTER: Sure. 
8 THE COURT: I donft mean to interrupt, but let me 
9 ask this. To what extent, in your view, do I handle Judge 
10 Stewartfs decision? 
11 MS. PORTER: We--we--
12 THE COURT: How should I--what do I do with it? 
13 MS. PORTER: Basically you can read it and find 
14 whatever informational value you think it might have or 
15 something, but it is not binding, it's not controlling. If 
16 you don't agree with it, you can and we believe, should, do 
17 your own independent evaluation of the record that has been 
18 provided to you and then apply that to the State Constitution. 
19 And in a few minute--in a couple of minutes, I'm 
20 going to give you the very authority to do that, with an only 
21 two-week-old Court of Appeals case and it's not cited because 
22 again, the first time they even suggested law of the case was 
23 just Friday afternoon. 
24 I do want to clarify one thing. I believe there was 
25 a statement made that law of the case only applied if there's 
_ 
no final--been no final ruling, et cetera; but I think that 
was a misstatement or a misspeaking, perhaps. Actually, one 
of the most common uses of the law of the case, which I know 
from painful experience 15 years ago, is actually after 
there's been a final order, it's gone up on appeal, goes back 
on some other issue and the Court--and the Appellate Courts 
typically use law of the case to say, now, you know, to the 
trial court, whatever issues you're going to decide here, 
don't be re-looking at any of the ones that have already been 
resolved. So, it is actually most commonly used with respect 
to--to whether it's final or not final. 
THE COURT: May I ask you, what is the difference 
between law of the case and res judicata? 
MS. PORTER: Principally--
THE COURT: If any? 
MS. PORTER: Well, there's--there's several 
principal differences and actually I'm going to get into some 
of those. There are different elements, there are different 
defenses available to a claim of res judicata versus law of 
the case. It--the most obvious difference is that res 
judicata only applies when there are two separate cases. Law 
of the case only applies when there's a single case; but if--
if I may, and if you feel in a minute that I haven't given you 
more detail on some of these differences, but I think you'll 
see in just a second what some of the very specific 
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differences are, because this is why we are severely 
prejudiced if they are allowed to make an argument, an 
untimely argument on law of the case. 
And I don't think I have to point that I--that the 
Utah Supreme Court has held numerous times that an argument 
raised for the first time in a reply memorandum is not proper 
and--and shouldn't be considered and is unfair to the opposing 
party. 
The defendants here, at least one of the defendants, 
said, well, one of the cases that you cite actually had some 
discussion about law of the case in it, as a--as a different 
issue. I would be surprised if that wasn't true of every 
single case that any party cited that has more than one issue 
that's been addressed, but they--they didn't cite it, it's 
not--it wasn't cited for law of the case principles. What 
they're basically arguing is that we should have read all of 
the cases and sifted through and found and said, well, here's 
an argument that maybe they should have made, so let's go 
ahead and respond to it. 
They, you know, we don't question other people's 
strategy and what arguments they choose to make. There may be 
reasons they thought they could argue res judicata, because 
for one thing, res judicata, according to them, you have n o -
no discretion. You're just--your hands are tied under res 
judicata. Quite--it's quite the opposite with law of the 
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case. So, that well be a strategic decision that they made. 
But some of the--the prejudice that we have here 
relates to these differences between these concepts. First of 
all, we've had no chance to brief it and it's too late now. 
The--the reference to the possibility of supplemental 
briefing, you know, one reason we have this sort of expedited 
briefing hearing schedule was so that the--to allow the--the 
rest of the discovery to be completed and trial to--to occur, 
because we raised the concern that it's now three-and-a-half 
years since the lawsuit was filed and we haven't been able to 
get to trial yet. 
So, no, you know, they chose, they were allowed to 
choose the scope of their motions and they did; but we also 
would have done--approached our own briefing differently had 
they argued law of the case. For example, they have re--
attempted to re-hash several purely legal rulings that already 
were ruled on by Judge Cassell and were uninterrupted or 
hadn't--were not addressed or modified by Judge Stewart. 
So, for example, you know that 20 pages that we 
spent talking about, how Brigham Young was arrested and you 
know, the framers and all of that information, all of that was 
run past Judge Cassell earlier, because they made the same 
argument that we had supposedly not shown how the State 
Constitutional protections were broader. We did all that with 
Judge Cassell, he ruled, yes, they are, on three of them. 
42 
There was a fourth one that he dismissed, but it--you know, 
had--had they argued law of the case, we would have said 
great, that just saved us 20 pages of arguing the history of 
the State Constitution. 
Same thing on Spackman. They made the same argument 
to Judge Cassell that were unmodified by Judge Stewart--I 
mean, pardon me. They made the same argument to Judge Cassell 
who made legal rulings about the law itself that Judge Stewart 
did not modify or disagree with, with relation to Spackman. 
We wouldn't have had to brief all that because we could have 
said, well, if we're going to argue law of the case, here's 
some nice ones that help us quite a bit. 
You know, Judge Cassell specifically ruled that the-
-that--in this particular case, equitable relief would not be 
adequate. But here, we're having to brief it again. You 
know, he made specific, and when he did cite his--for one--for 
a different point, we cited his opinion but we didn't even 
provide the Court a copy of it because they weren't arguing 
law of the case. 
Same thing with the effect of the Jensens' plea in 
abeyance. Judge Cassell ruled as a matter of law that--that 
such a plea in abeyance does not bar these types of claims 
because you're--you1re entitled to argue coercion, the 
improper stacking, you know, the--the arguments we made at--if 
one claim has probable cause and the other doesn't, it's not a 
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full bar. 
All those arguments were raised with Judge Cassell, 
he ruled on the legal issues, but we were forced to brief them 
again because the defendants brought them up again. So, 
again, had they taken a different approach, we would have 
taken a different approach. 
Also, law of the case, one of the defenses, so to 
speak, or the responses that a party can do with respect to 
law of the case is, a party is totally allowed to argue that 
the prior ruling is erroneous. Now, remember, they say under 
res judicata, you1re just stuck with it; but it is an actual, 
express argument that a party's entitled to make when it's law 
of the case. We could have taken that 35 or 40 pages of 
issues that Cassell had already ruled on where the law was 
already--of the case was already established, and we could 
have gone through and focused on convincing you that Judge 
Stewart's ruling was erroneous. You know, we've made some 
references to it, but we had to--we had, you know, the same 
space constraints that everyone does. 
But--so that is another serious way, because 
remember, they say--and I think they're probably right--that 
arguing that the ruling is erroneous is not something that you 
typically are able to argue with res judicata. 
Second--or we also would have been able to point out 
the different standards that apply to law of the case. And 
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here's an example. This--I did have time to just run law of 
the case and pulled up the most recent case on law of the 
case. It is two weeks old, obviously, it's not cited under 
the circumstances. It's called State vs. Ruiz, R-u-i-z, it 
was issued by the Court of Appeals on December 26th and the 
cite of it is 2008 Utah Appellate 470. The West Law cite, 
your Honor, is 2008 West Law 5376549. There is no P.3rd cite 
yet. 
In that case, this--this Court of Appeals case 
actually completes negates what Mr. Morse postulated, which 
was that you would be--you're no more free to reconsider Judge 
Stewart's rulings than you would be to reconsider Judge--and I 
can't remember who he picked, I'll just say Hilder, or--or, 
you know, somebody--somebody else's rulings. 
Well, actually, this case does the opposite. In 
this case, Judge Skanchy took over when Judge Fuchs retired, 
took over a case, there had already been a specific ruling by 
Judge Fuchs. Judge Skanchy did not agree with the ruling and 
so he opened it up again and ruled the opposite. 
The defendant--this was a criminal case--the 
defendant said, hey, law of the case here. And the Court of 
Appeals said, you know, no, a judge can re-consider these 
rulings at any time. 
The--in Paragraph 10 of this opinion, the Court said 
the law of the case doctrine is essentially a matter of 
45 
1 judicial economy rather than jurisdiction. 
2 And then a little further down after the citation, a 
3 judge can change his or her mind any time up until the entry 
4 of final judgment, which is true, even if the judge has taken 
5 over the case from another judge as a trial court is not 
6 inexorably bound by its own precedent. 
7 And there's been no final judgment in this case. 
8 there's been no final judgment on the State Constitutional 
9 claims. If you disagree with all or part of Judge Stewart's 
10 ruling, we think it's not only your option, but your 
11 obligation to--to say so and to do what you believe is correct 
12 under the Utah State law. 
13 You know--you know what's ironic about the 
14 defendants' argument is that they say--I mean, Judge Stewart 
15 made a statement. He didn't just say, I'm dismissing for lack 
16 I of jurisdiction under 13-67. He made an affirmative statement 
17 that he was not deciding the State issues, he was remanding 
18 them to State Court because they were important Constitutional 
19 issues that should be determined by the State Court. 
20 And yet the defendants are saying, but at the same 
21 time, he tied you hands and said, oh, by the way, I've already 
22 made the ruling for you. Their oral argument doesn't comport 
23 with what Judge Stewart apparently contemplated, at least 
24 judging by that particular statement. 
25 THE COURT: May I ask this? 
4F" 
MS. PORTER: Yes. 
THE COURT: In terms of the distinction that might 
be made between any of the defendants, is there any? In terms 
of the--the motions that have been made--
MS. PORTER: Well--
THE COURT: --is there any distinction to be made? 
MS. PORTER: --on--arguably one, two sets of 
defendants basically decided to hitch their whole wagon 
essentially to res judicata, at least two of them. I think 
Eisenman did, too, because her fact statement, all it did was 
refer back to the exhibits from Federal Court, did not provide 
any record to you in the State Court. So, Wagner and Alberton 
basically--in fact, that's all they did for their fact 
statement, as we pointed out. They have based it all on res 
judicata. 
Anderson basically did the same thing, although 
they--they're trying to make an argument now, but again, not 
even providing you with a record, but simply saying, you know, 
here, you can just have what--you know, look at what Judge 
Stewart did. 
I think the same thing is true of Eisenman, because 
all they did, they did not provide you with a separate State 
record, all they did was say, see, Wag--the doctors' exhibits, 
the only exhibits that they had that I believe that they were 
referring to were with respect to the Federal claim. I can't-
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